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1I. INTRODUCTION 
Laser technology has greatly advanced since the first laser was demonstrated in 
1960. It would seem from the ubiquitous fiber optic cable networks of today that 
attempting to use lasers to communicate through free space is a liberating step from the 
fixed and restrictive cabling installations. In fact, history has it that military applications 
were attempting to leverage on free space optics (FSO) ever since the 1960’s. However, 
even until the late 1980’s, FSO technology has been plagued by limited range, low 
capacity, alignment problems, as well as vulnerabilities to weather interferences. 
In the military, operations demand secure, relevant, and timely information. The 
ability to relay massive amounts of information is becoming a critical determinant of 
military success. For this reason, information superiority on the battlefield is one of the 
first objectives. Furthermore, the complexity of military missions has also dramatically 
increased, with more diverse theaters of operation, expanded spectrums of conflict, and a 
tremendous increase in the requirement for information to be delivered almost 
immediately to the warfighter. 
Today, FSO communication has not seen widespread use in the military. With the 
bandwidth available to FSO anywhere from 100 to 100,000 times higher than other radio 
frequency or microwave transmitters, use of FSO technology could give a military force 
much leverage over their rivals. While the technology has somewhat matured for fixed-
site commercial deployments, FSO technology would be very much more useful to the 
military if it could be deployed on mobile platforms. 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms are seen as a 
major target for FSO technology as these platforms need to disseminate large volumes of 
sensor, imagery, and video to the fighting forces, often in real-time. Popular ISR 
platforms include planes, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s), and satellites, although 
other platforms are certainly possible.  
2It is the intent of this thesis to study the feasibility of deploying FSO 
communication terminals on these mobile military platforms. Such a feasibility study 
would require much understanding of the various issues involved in FSO technology. 
Many of these issues would be equally applicable to non-mobile platforms. 
While it is the aim of this report to provide good coverage of the various issues 
involved, it would not be possible within the scope of this study to discuss the issues 
unique to all the possible mobile platforms. For example, it should suffice to say that 
FSO is a line-of-sight communications technology and the transmitter’s line-of-sight to 
the receiver should not be blocked. No attempt will be made to propose the location on 
planes, ships, or satellites where the FSO terminal should be placed. 
This study will begin with a survey of the latest developments in FSO technology. 
Following this, an attempt will be made to understand the inherent benefits of FSO 
technology and how these can be leveraged on. This will be followed by a look of the 
limitations and challenges of this technology, and how they can be overcome. Finally, the 
study will look at the challenges of acquisition, pointing, and tracking, which are peculiar 
to line-of-sight mobile communications. 
 
 
3II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
To date, Free Space Optics (FSO) communication has been largely confined to 
communicating between fixed sites. For years now, companies like Terabeam, AirFiber 
and LightPointe have been installing FSO terminals behind windows, on rooftops, and on 
outdoor mounts. These systems have been installed for clients wishing to have broadband 
access without the hassle and costs of fiber optic cable solutions. The performance of 
these terminals has been encouraging, with bandwidths up to 2.5 Gbps and bit error rates 
of 10-9 (one in a billion) or better. However, other than the fact that these terminals are 
not installed on mobile platforms, the range of these systems has been limited to 4 km or 
less. 
The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), under the U.S. 
Department of Energy and operated by the University of California, had in early 2002 
successfully tested a 28 km FSO link between the Laboratory (in Livermore, CA) and 
Mount Diablo under the Secure Air-Optic Transport and Routing Network (SATRN) 
program [Johnston 2002]. Data was transmitted at 2.5 Gbps. The wavelength and power 
used was not reported, although it was said to be optical, and that “the laser beams used 
for communication are not visible or harmful in any way.” Bit-error rates were also 
quoted as “quite reasonable for an unoptimized system.” Researches also say they have 
gained experience with operation in freezing temperatures, winds of up to 40 mph, low-
visibility conditions and light fog. Tony Ruggeiro, the principal investigator on the LLNL 
project, said that the SATRN team plans to demonstrate a 28-km air- link with an 
aggregate bit rate of 100 Gbps. 
4 
Figure 1.   A SATRN Team Member Standing Next to the Transceiver Telescope  
on Top of Mount Diablo (From: [Johnston 2002]) 
 
The range of an FSO link is usually limited only by the power used. While many 
demonstrations using “eye-safe” lasers has been limited to distances of 28 km or less, the 
United States Air Force Research Laboratory Sensors Directorate (AFRL/SN) claims to 
have successfully tested a 150 km link back in August and September 1995 [Gill 1997]. 
The tests were conducted between a laser terminal on Mount Mauna Loa on the island of 
Hawaii and a similar laser terminal on Mount Haleakala on the island of Maui. The 
power used in these lasers is reported to be greater than 200 mW. This is a high figure for 
lasers with an eye-safe distance of approximately 1.5 km. The AFRL/SN claims to have 
achieved a data rate of 1.1 Gbps and full duplex communications. Furthermore, the tests 
were conducted for follow-on air-to-air operations. A motion and vibration base was used 
to simulate an aircraft environment. Communication error rates of better than 10-6 were 
achieved during simulated motion. The AFRL/SN intends to demonstrate FSO links 
between aerial platforms at distances up to 500 km [Gill 1997]. 
5An operational deployment of FSO links on mobile pla tforms has been achieved 
by the European Space Agency (ESA). The ESA is formed by 15 member states (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). In November 2001, the 
Artemis (Advanced Relay Technology Mission) and SPOT 4 (Systeme Pour l'observation 
de la Terre) satellites established 4 data links, lasting 4 to 20 minutes, with a data rate of 
50 Mbps. This was using the SILEX (Semiconductor laser Inter-satellite Link 
Experiment) system. The Artemis satellite was in a parking orbit at 31,000 km, while the 
SPOT 4 satellite was orbiting at an altitude of 832 km. This would imply that the 
satellites were moving at roughly 7,000 mph and 16,600 mph respectively. The average 
distance between the satellites during communication was 38,500 km. The bit error rate 
for this space link was reported to be consistently in the range of 10-9 to 10-10 
[Oppenhäuser 2001]. 
 
Figure 2.   Artemis and SPOT 4 Communicating via the SILEX system –  
Artist’s Impression (From: [Oppenhäuser 2001]) 
 
The U.S. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the U.S. Air Force also 
have a laser communication experiment in orbit on the GeoLite (Geosynchronous 
Lightweight Technology Experiment) spacecraft. The platform, which was launched in 
May 2001, operates as a theater data-dissemination system in the Western Pacific [JIG 
2002]. 
6The experiments would allow the NRO to study advanced laser pointing 
instrumentation from a geosynchronous orbit. Manuel DePonte, general manager of the 
Milsatcom Division at the Aerospace Corporation, says that the data rates possible with 
laser communication would especially be important in commanding and obtaining 
intelligence from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and that achieving hundreds of 
gigabits per second would be a priority. The UAVs are eventually expected to be able to 
establish laser communication links to the Milstar and Defense Satellite Communications 
System (DSCS) communications-satellite networks [Covault 2002]. Unfortunately, 
further details of these experiments are classified. 
In another article, Jane’s Information Group reports that the U.S. Air Force has 
notional plans for spending US$7.6 billion over FY04 – FY09 on airborne laser 
communication terminals to be used on platforms such as the Global Hawk UAV, U-2 
reconnaissance aircraft, E-3 Airborne Warning & Control System, E-8 Joint STARS 
ground surveillance platform, E-10 Multi-mission Command and Control Aircraft, the 
'Smart Tanker' as well as ‘Transformational Satellites’ (TSATs) [JIG 2003-2]. The details 






Figure 3.   Some of the USAF-Proposed Platforms to be Equipped with Laser 
Communication Terminals (After: [JIG 2003-1]) 
 
 
7III. LEVERAGING FSO TECHNOLOGY 
Lasers operate in the infrared, visible and ultraviolet regions of the 
electromagnetic spectrum, from one millimeter down to 100 nanometers in wavelength. 
Typically, lasers are described by their wavelength as contrasted with radar systems that 
are characterized by frequency, because the laser’s frequency is 10,000 to 1,000,000 
times higher than typical microwave radars. Both microns (mm or 10-6 meters) or 
nanometers (nm or 10-9 meters) will be used in this study to characterize lasers. In 
contrast, radar systems usually have wavelengths on the order of millimeters to 




Military operations demand secure, relevant, and timely information. For this 
reason, information superiority on the battlefield is one of the first objectives. Large 
volumes of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) imagery and video are 
increasingly being sent from sensors to shooters. Faster data links are needed for faster 
response timelines. Also, new missions may be enabled, like the sending of video instead 
of still imagery, or the sending of higher quality imagery and video. With faster links, all 
of this can be achieved while still meeting the required response times. FSO systems 
operate at significantly higher frequencies than the other RF systems of today. Therefore, 
they have the potential of reducing the timeline for delivering information. This section 
looks at the implications of operating in the EMR bands used for FSO. 
 
1.  Higher Frequencies 
A signal of higher frequency can potentially send data at a higher rate. If the 
distortion and attenuation effects of the atmosphere are non-existent, then the data rate 
theoretically possible from an electro-magnetic radiation (EMR) wave is directly 
proportional to its frequency (called the carrier). Of course, suitable modulation schemes 
8need developing to take advantage of this carrier frequency. Table 1 gives an indicative 
range of frequencies for the different EMR bands. 
 
EMR Bands  Frequencies, f (Hertz) 
Radio 30 ´ 103 to 3.0 ´ 109 
Microwave 3.0 ´ 109 to 3.0 ´ 1012 
Infrared 3.0 ´ 1012 to 4.3 ´ 1014 
 Far Infrared 3.0 ´ 1012 to 2.0 ´ 1013 
 Long Wavelength Infrared (LWIR) 2.0 ´ 1013 to 3.8 ´ 1013 
 Mid Wavelength Infrared (MWIR) 3.8 ´ 1013 to 1.0 ´ 1014 
 Short Wavelength Infrared (SWIR) 1.0 ´ 1014 to 2.0 ´ 1014 
 Near Infrared 2.0 ´ 1014 to 4.3 ´ 1014 
Visible Light 4.3 ´ 1014 to 7.5 ´ 1014 
Ultraviolet 7.5 ´ 1014 to 6.0 ´ 1016 
 
Table 1 Table of EMR Frequency Bands 
 
The radio and microwave bands are widely used today for wireless 
communication. Above the frequency of 3 Terahertz (3.0 ´ 1012 Hz) starts the infrared 
band. Visible light takes up a small range of frequencies above infrared (2.0 ´ 1014 to 4.3 
´ 1014 Hz) while ultraviolet radiation has the highest frequencies of the optical 
wavelengths (7.5 ´ 1014 to 6.0 ´ 1016 Hz). 
Many of the FSO systems available today operate in the near infrared band, which 
has a frequency range on the order of magnitude of 1014 Hz. Comparing this with 
microwave frequencies (magnitude of 109 to 1012 Hz), FSO systems in the near infrared 
band can potentially provide a 100 to 100,000 times higher data rate than the microwave 
9radios we have today. Of course, this depends on the type of modulation used (i.e. how 
the carrier is changed or varied so that it becomes an information-bearing signal). 
LightPointe’s [LightPointe 2003] FlightApex is one of the highest bandwidth 
commercially available FSO products today. It uses lasers at a frequency of almost 200 
Terahertz (2 ´ 1014 Hz) to achieve full-duplex speeds of 2.5 Gbps for distances of up to 
1km. 
 
Figure 4.   LightPointe’s FlightApex Linkhead (From: [LightPointe 2003]) 
 
The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has demonstrated an FSO link of 
the same data (2.5 Gbps) over a distance of 28 km. With the help of wavelength division 
multiplexing (WDM), the LLNL had previously managed to scale the capacity of an FSO 
link to 20 Gbps between buildings. Tony Ruggeiro, principal investigator of the LLNL 
SATRN project, says that they intend to further demonstrate a WDM link with an 
aggregate bit rate of 100 Gbps over a distance of 28 km [Johnston 2002]. 
 
2. Modulation Schemes 
The maximum data rate that can be transmitted does not solely depend on the 
frequency of the signal used. A lot depends on the modulation scheme, which is how 
information is encoded within the signal. FSO systems, not unlike the fiber optic cable 
networks of today, largely employ on-off keying (OOK) modulation or some variant. 
OOK is where the presence of a signal represents a binary “1”, while the absence of the 
signal represents a binary “0”. This presents a fundamental limitation of sending one bit 
per period of the carrier. 
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RF systems, on the other hand, make use of very developed modulation schemes. 
Some schemes like spread spectrum techniques send redundant signals to attain more 
robustness as well as anti-jamming effects. Therefore, spread spectrum techniques do not 
usually aim to attain high data rates with the available bandwidth. Other modulation 
techniques like the Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM) combine amplitude 
modulation and phase shift keying to attain higher data rates while still only using the 
same carrier frequency. While a detailed discussion of QAM is not within the scope of 
this report, it is necessary for this discussion to understand that QAM is able to send more 
data every period of the carrier signal because the varied amplitude and phase of the 
signal allows each signal to represent a series of binary digits rather than just a single bit. 
For example, 4-QAM is where there are 4 combinations of amplitude and phase of the 
signal, and therefore each symbol in 4-QAM represents 2 binary digits (since 2 bits can 
represent 4 levels). Therefore, 4-QAM can theoretically send 2 bits for every symbol it 
transmits. 64-QAM, which is a popular modulation scheme for microwave frequency 
radios, makes use of 64 combinations of amplitude and phase, and therefore each symbol 
in 64-QAM represents 6 bits. As a result, 64-QAM can theoretically send 6 bits for every 
symbol it transmits. Microwave radios are usually limited to 64-QAM or sometimes 128-
QAM because increasing the number of levels of QAM makes the signal more 
susceptible to noise. 
Modulation schemes like QAM make more efficient use of the bandwidth than 
schemes like OOK. Therefore, the maximum data rate that an EMR signal can achieve 
cannot be determined solely from the frequency of the signal. That is, a laser signal 
cannot be said to be capable of sending data x times faster than a microwave transmission 
simply because the frequency used by the laser is x times higher. 
Researchers have found it difficult to apply advanced modulation techniques like 
QAM on lasers because of the way lasers are generated. If this were achieved, lasers 
should be able to attain greater QAM levels than microwaves because of their high 
signal-to-noise ratio. This will be discussed further in the section on bit error rate (BER). 
Of course, there are others who say that applying more bandwidth-efficient techniques to 
lasers is not necessary because of the wide bandwidth available to lasers. Furthermore, 
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lasers are unlikely to interfere with other laser signals because of their small beam spread. 
Therefore, there is not a high motivation to research bandwidth-efficient modulation for 
lasers. 
 
B. SPECTRUM LICENSING 
Mobile communications, computer data, radio stations, aircraft, taxis, and even 
astronauts rely on radios to keep in touch with one another. Because this radio spectrum 
cannot be expanded, it is coming under increased pressure to carry more and more 
communications. The worldwide introduction of digital mobile communications is 
causing concerns of a spectrum drought on several continents. Of late, industry comments 
have shown that spectrum and bandwidth will become a tradable commodity in the near 
term, fetching high prices because of supply and demand. 
The radio-frequency spectrum is the world’s natural resource, and it needs to be 
well-managed to ensure that systems do not interfere with one another. The International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) regulates the use of radio frequencies throughout the 
world. Nations are obligated to comply with the spectrum allocations specified in the ITU 
Radio Regulations’ Article S5 (International Table of Frequency Allocations ). However, 
domestic spectrum uses may differ from the international allocations provided these 
domestic uses do not conflict with neighboring spectrum uses that do comply with 
international regulations or bi- lateral agreements. 
The World Radiocommunication Conference held in year 2000 (WRC-2000) 
extended the mandate of the ITU radio regulations from 400 GHz to 1000 GHz (1 THz). 
Although the ITU did not make any specific allocations to radiocommunication services, 
it has set a preliminary agenda to review studies and consider allocations in the frequency 
bands above 275 GHz during WRC-2007. Therefore, the ITU does not currently regulate 
frequencies in the optical spectrum (above 3 THz), although it is known that studies have 
begun on this [IARU 2002]. 
Most nations regulate the use of radio frequencies by requiring that the use of 
these frequencies be licensed. In the United States, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) issues these licenses. Obtaining a license may involve equipment 
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tests (for intentional and unintentional radiations), examinations for operators, and a 
license fee which pays for a license that will usually be valid for a specified number of 
years. The FCC does not require a license for the Industrial, Scientific, and Medical 
(ISM) bands (between 902 – 928 MHz and 2.4 – 2.484 GHz) and the Unlicensed 
National Information Infrastructure (U-NII) bands (between 5.725 – 5.825 GHz). 
However, the FCC rules as specified in Part 15 of Title 47 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations still apply. Therefo re, the use of microwave frequencies may require a 
license, and FCC rules should be adhered to. 
The ITU and the FCC do not control the use of optical frequencies, although it 
certainly may in the years to come. FSO systems that have been deployed are still few 
and far between, and the highly directional nature of optical transmissions imply that 
issues of interference would be rare. Furthermore, optical signals are highly attenuated by 
the atmosphere. Therefore, the likelihood of a stray optical signal interfering with another 
system is highly unlikely. 
The need to control the use of FSO systems come from a safety aspect rather than 
managing spectrum use. Laser safety is governed internationally by the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), while within the United States, the Center for 
Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) and the American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI) ensure product and user safety respectively. Laser safety will be discussed in 
much greater detail in a later section. 
 
C. BIT ERROR RATE 
There is disagreement in the industry as to whether the acronym BER stands for 
bit error rate or bit error ratio. Proponents of the latter argue that BER is a measure of 
erroneous bits with respect to the total number of bits transmitted, received, or processed. 
It is not a measure with respect to time, and so, many deprecate the term bit error rate. 
However, the term bit error rate is more popularly used in technical literatures. In this 
report, no distinction is made between the two terms and they may be used 
interchangeably. 
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Many papers have been written (often by FSO vendors themselves) that FSO 
systems typically have lower BER than other radio frequency (RF) communication 
systems. This may mislead a reader to infer that FSO is a better technology than other RF 
systems. In actuality, the BER from a system does not depend on the technology alone. It 
depends on the quality of the transmitted signal, the power used by the transmitter, the 
resilience of the transmission over the medium, the dis tance between transmitter and 
receiver, the sensitivity of the receiver, the electronics involved, etc.  
For example, a particular FSO system may be specified to have a much lower 
BER than an RF system. However, the FSO system only operates over 1 km, while the 
RF system operates over 5 km. If the FSO transmitter and receiver were placed 5 km 
apart instead, the BER on the FSO system would likely experience a much higher BER 
than that of the RF system. As another example, an FSO system may be specified to have 
a lower BER than an RF system, and both operate over the same distance. While this may 
be true on a clear day, this may not be so in the event of heavy fog. Once again, the FSO 
system is likely to experience a much higher BER than the RF system. 
Therefore, it is important to note that whatever BER values that are quoted for a 
communications system are specific to that system, and may vary depending on factors 
such as distance and weather. Since it is not possible to declare whether FSO or RF 
systems have  better BER, this report will instead analyze the issues that contribute to 
BER. 
In this report, BER is understood to be the number of erroneous bits received out 
of the total number of bits transmitted. This is also sometimes called the transmission 
BER. For example, a BER of 10-6 means that on average, one erroneous bit is received 
out of a million bits transmitted. 
Indeed, FSO systems do have a quality that allows them to attain low BER. This 
is attributed to the fact that the lasers that are used in FSO systems typically have much 
smaller spectral widths than RF systems. Spectral width is a measure of the range of 
frequencies that are transmitted. An ideal transmission is one where only one frequency is 
transmitted. Such a transmission is said to be fully coherent. A laser source is said to be 
fully coherent if the electromagnetic waves in the source have a constant phase 
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relationship. This implies that there is only a single frequency being transmitted, which is 
difficult to achieve practically. A laser transmission will usually consist of a small range 
of frequencies together with the intended frequency (usually called the carrier). 
This non- ideal output of lasers is attributed to what is called Doppler broadening. 
Doppler broadening is caused by the thermal motion of the atoms in the material which 
generates the laser. This thermal motion causes a Doppler shift in the frequencies of the 
photons emitted by these atoms. This range of frequencies theoretically forms a Gaussian 
distribution [Nave 2003]. In the fields of probability theory and statistics, a Gaussian 
distribution is also called a normal distribution. 
This spread of frequencies is known as its spectral width. The usual method of 
specifying spectral width is the full width at half maximum (FWHM). As indicated in 
Figure 5, the FWHM is the width of the spectrum taken at half of the maximum output 
intensity. Therefore, the figure shows a laser with a FWHM of 2 nm. Lasers typically 
have a FWHM of less than 5 nanometers (5 ´ 10-9 meters). 
 
Figure 5.   Gaussian Distribution of Laser Output 
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The knowledge that the distribution of frequencies follows a Gaussian distribution 
allows us to infer additional information about the laser source. Firstly, it can be shown 
that the value of FWHM corresponds to 2.355 times the standard deviation of a Gaussian 
distribution [Nave 2003]. This is illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.   Relationship Between FWHM and the Standard Deviation 
(After: [Nave 2003]) 
 
Therefore, for our laser in Figure 5 which has an FWHM value of 2 nm, the 
standard deviation, s, is equal to the FWHM (2 nm) divided by 2.355, which gives 
roughly 0.85 nm. 
A property of the Gaussian distribution is that 68.26% of the observations will be 
found within 1 standard deviation of the mean. 95.46% of the observations will be found 
within 2 standard deviations, while 99.73% will be found within 3 standard deviations. 
This is illustrated in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7.   Percentage of Observations of a Gaussian Distribution 
 
Therefore, for our example laser with carrier frequency of 850 nm, FWHM of 2 
nm, and calculated standard deviation of 0.85 nm, 68.26% of the laser power will be 
within the range of 849.15 to 850.85 nm, 95.46% (most) of the laser power will be within 
the range of 848.30 to 851.70 nm, and 99.73% (almost all) of the laser power will be 
within the range of 847.45 to 852.55 nm. 
 
Figure 8.   Distribution of Laser Power 
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Understanding the statistics involved in a Gaussian distribution allows us to 
calculate the percentage of power in any arbitrary interval of wavelengths. The existence 
of Gaussian tables also means that heavy mathematical calculations need not be involved. 
For example, the percentage of laser power within the FWHM interval (between 848 and 
852 nm) can be found to be approximately 76%. 
 
Figure 9.   Percentage of Laser Power within FWHM 
 
The narrower the spectral width of a laser source, the more energy is concentrated 
around the central (carrier) frequency. Figure 10 illustrates two lasers which have the 
same input power, but where laser A has a spectral width of 2 nm, while laser B’s 
spectral width is twice that of laser A (4 nm). It can be seen that laser A’s peak power at 
the central frequency (850 nm) is twice that of laser B, even though the same total power 
is applied to both lasers. 
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Figure 10.   Comparison of Laser Outputs with Different Spectral Widths 
 
A sharper profile is desirable of a laser source so that the transmitted pulse can be 
distinguished from the ambient noise in the atmosphere (typically from the sun). 
Furthermore, as a laser leaves its cavity, its signal is degraded through absorption, 
scattering, and dispersion. Absorption is where the laser’s energy is lost to the 
atmosphere at the molecular or atomic level. Scattering is a phenomenon in which the 
direction, frequency, or polarization of the wave is changed when the wave encounters 
discontinuities in the medium, or interacts with the material at the atomic or molecular 
level. Dispersion occurs when the various wave components (i.e. frequencies) of the 
signal have different propagation velocities within the physical medium. All these 
phenomena will be discussed in greater detail in a later section on the atmospheric 
effects. These phenomena cause the laser source to be attenuated, and therefore much less 
useful energy will be able to reach the receiver. 
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Yet another reason why not all the transmitted power may reach the receiver is 
because of the divergence of a laser beam as it travels great distances. The size of the 
beam at the location of the receiver may be too large for any practical receiver to collect. 
Beam divergence will be discussed in further detail in a later section on security. 
Instead of measuring the spectral width of transmissions (which is a measure of 
the range of wavelengths), microwave and other RF transmitters provide their bandwidth 
figure instead. This is a measure of the range of frequencies instead of wavelengths. 
However, this can be easily converted to wavelengths in order make a comparison of 
spectral widths. The bandwidth of RF transmissions is sometimes called the transmission 
purity. The popular measure of purity for an RF signal is the Q factor, which is basically 
the intended transmit frequency divided by its bandwidth. 
For a fair comparison, we first look at the bandwidth used for an RF transmission 
which is only attempting to transmit a single frequency. While the spectral widths of laser 
transmitters are typically less than 5 nm, that of microwaves and other RF 
communications may range from 100 nm to a few hundred microns, depending on the 
resonator/transducer/oscillator used. Therefore, the spectral purity of laser transmissions 
may be 2 to 5 orders of magnitude finer than other RF communications. In other words, 
an RF transmission may require up to 10,000 times more power to attain the same signal-
to-noise ratio as laser transmitters. 
Having said this, much research is underway to improve the Q factor of RF 
transmissions. Microwave radios using Sapphire resonators and more recently SiO 2 
monocrystals have reportedly been able to achieve spectral widths as narrow as 4 nm 
[Salzenstein 2002]. However, these resonators are yet to see widespread use. 
The modulation of an EMR signal plays a big role in its BER. Spread spectrum 
schemes used in RF communication transmit multiple redundant frequencies for every bit 
of information. One might think that since multiple fr equencies were used, then more 
power would have to be used in order for the collection of frequencies to be detected with 
the  same BER.   However,  one  of  the main  purposes  of  spread spectrum is  a  low 
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probability of detection. Therefore, the power used for transmitting the individual 
frequencies is not increased since they are redundant and a few of them can be lost 
without losing information. 
Other RF modulation schemes like Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM) are 
designed for maximum data rate over a single carrier frequency. A QAM receiver needs 
to be able to differentiate between signals which have small differences in amplitude and 
phase. As a result, these signals are more susceptible to noise as a small change in 
amplitude or phase of the signal may cause the receiver to misinterpret the received data. 
Laser communication systems largely use on-off keying (OOK) or a variant. As 
explained previously, this is where the laser is either on or off. When the laser is on, its 
narrow spectral width presents a high signal-to-noise ratio and hence low BER. Other RF 
systems have much wider spectral widths and hence higher BER. Certain schemes of 
modulation of RF signals (e.g. QAM) reduce the acceptable signal- to-noise ratio and 
hence cause these RF signa ls to have higher BER. 
 
D. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY 
The success of modern military forces depends a great deal on the effective use of 
sophisticated radio communication and navigation systems. Historically, the enemy has 
employed electronic countermeasures (ECM) to detect the presence of these radio signals 
and either disrupt them or exploit them. Radio systems can be disrupted by jamming or 
by locating and destroying them. On the other hand, exploitation involves using the 
transmissions for intelligence and counter- intelligence purposes. Prior to the development 
of high quality data security and transmission security techniques, it was possible to 
gather intelligence from the received signals by demodulating and decoding (deciphering) 
them. For simple systems it is also possible to “spoof” (or mimic) them to provide false 
information (counter- intelligence). Radio transmissions can also be exploited, even when 
they employ high quality security techniques, by simple radio direction finding (RDF) or 
position monitoring. A scenario of these basic ECM techniques is shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11.   Electronic Warfare Overview for Military Systems  
(After: [Russell 1997]) 
 
Various concepts have been developed to counter these ECM techniques. These 
have been called the Electronic Counter-Counter Measures or ECCM. Low Probability of 
Detection (LPD) is concerned with preventing the enemy from detecting a transmission. 
Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) is concerned with preventing the enemy from tapping 
onto the transmission. Low Probability of Exploitation (LPE) is concerned with 
preventing the exploitation of the signal by decoding, spoofing, or position monitoring. 
LPE design would deny the enemy knowledge of the system, its modulation 
characteristics, its use, and its users. Anti-Jamming (AJ) is the prevention of a denial-of-
service (DoS) attack by spurious signals sent from a jammer. 
This section will look at all these concepts in turn and see how FSO technology 
performs in each of them. 
 
1. Probability of Detection 
The conventional way of detecting an RF transmission is through the use of 
spectrum analyzers or RF meters. These cannot be used to detect laser transmissions. In 
order to detect a laser transmission, a compatible FSO receiver or some form of electro-
optical system needs to convert the optical frequencies to electrical signals. 
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Generally, there are two places in which a laser beam can be detected. Firstly, it 
can be detected from within the beam. The beam divergence determines the probability of 
detection from within the beam. Secondly, the beam may be “seen” from outside the 
beam. In this case, the “visibility” of the beam determines whether it can be detected. 
a. Beam Divergence 
An ideal electromagnetic transmission will travel directly to the receiver. 
However, this requires a fully coherent source. That is, the electromagnetic waves in the 
source have a constant phase relationship. This implies that there is only a single 
frequency being transmitted, which is difficult to achieve practically. If a source is non-
coherent, the electromagnetic waves in the source will interfere with one another, causing 
the beam to diverge. 
 
Figure 12.   An ideal transmission with no divergence 
 
 
Figure 13.   A non-coherent transmission source diverges 
 
As shown in Figure 13, when a transmitted signal diverges, it forms a cone 
with the tip at the transmitter end. Practically, this is a spherical cone i.e. the base of the 
cone is curved. However, for simplicity, we assume that the base is flat, giving a normal 
cone. 
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State-of-the-art radio and microwave transmitters have a divergence angle 
(q) of a few degrees. Lasers, on the other hand, are generated through wavelength-
controlled photon emissions. Most of them generate light in a very narrow band around a 
single, central wavelength. Because this characteristic manifests itself in visible lasers as 
a very pure, single color, the narrow linewidth is termed monochromaticity. For example, 
the neodymium laser used in most laser designators (the ubiquitous “Nd:YAG”) 
generates an output beam at 1.064 microns, with a typical bandwidth of 0.00045 microns, 
an amazingly narrow linewidth of 0.04 percent of the central wavelength. 
Therefore, laser emissions are highly coherent. Therefore, laser beams 
typically have a divergence of less than a milliradian (approximately 0.057 degree). Some 
systems can be designed to have sub-microradian divergences. A small laser beam with a 
one milliradian divergence would expand to about one meter in diameter after traveling a 
kilometer. 
Because of their small size, semiconductor diode lasers usually have 
divergences measured in degrees, expanding rapidly. However, this beam divergence can 
be substantially reduced by using collimators. A collimator is a device for changing the 
diverging light or other radiation from a point source to a parallel beam. A laser system 
with an output beam diameter of one meter could readily have a 0.05 milliradian beam 
divergence, expanding to only about 25 meters after traveling 500 kilometers. This 
pencil- like beam of light permits highly accurate placement of energy on a target for 
efficient communication links. The beam can be used for covert applications because it is 
very difficult to detect the beam without intercepting it. The disadvantage, of course, is 
that pointing the beam requires a high degree of precision, which will be discussed later 
in this report. 
The locations in which an enemy could detect a laser transmission is 
effectively anywhere within the volume of the cone described earlier. A highly divergent 
beam implies that there are more locations in which the enemy could detect the 
transmitted signal. The volume of the cone is found by the formula hr 2
3
1
p , where r is the 
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radius of the base of the cone, and h is the furthest distance from the transmitter in which 
the transmitted signal is still of sufficient power to be detected. 
For comparison purpose, assume that a transmitted signal can reach a 
distance of 20 km (i.e. h = 20,000 m). 
For a microwave transmitter with a divergence angle of 2 degrees,  
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For a laser transmitter with a divergence angle of 2 arcseconds, 
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The volume of the transmission cone for the microwave transmitter is 
more than 12 million times greater than that of the laser transmitter. It may be interpreted 
that an adversary is 12 million times more likely to detect the transmission. 
Many factors may affect whether an eavesdropper may be able to locate a 
detector within the volume of the cone. For example, locating a detector between two 
planes or between a ship and a plane may be much more difficult than between two land 
systems. Therefore, while the divergence angle greatly influences the probability of 
detection of laser transmissions, the feasibility of locating a detector within that 
transmission cone is also an important factor. 
It should be highlighted that while the notion of beam divergence is an 
acceptable description of a laser transmission, it is usually not so for other RF 
transmissions. Spurious transmissions outside the main beam are usually transmitted by 
RF antennas. These spurious transmissions are called side lobes. Larger RF antennas 
usually reduce the intensity of these side lobes. However, many applications require the 
antennas to be small. These side lobes provide more opportunity for an eavesdropper to 
detect the transmitted signal. 
RF transmissions have an azimuth pattern similar to that shown in Figure 
14. The majority of the power of an RF antenna would be concentrated in a main lobe. 
The figure also illustrates that the beam divergence (q) of RF transmissions is determined 
by taking the angle formed by the main lobe at the half-power points (1/2P0). q is also 
known as the half power beam width. 
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Figure 14.   Azimuth Pattern of an RF Transmission (From: [Atkins 2002]) 
 
Other than the main lobe, several side lobes may be formed. Although 
these side lobes are of lower power than the main lobe, they still represent spurious 
emissions outside the intended direction of communication. Several antenna designs even 
have emissions behind the antennas. Therefore, an eavesdropper may be able to detect 
these spurious emissions if he is close enough to the transmitter. 
Figure 15 illustrates a typical azimuth pattern of a laser transmission. An 
azimuth pattern shows the angular direction of transmissions. As can be seen from the 
figure, laser beams usually only radiate in the direction that it is pointing. 
 
Figure 15.   Azimuth Pattern of a Laser (After: [Atkins 2002]) 
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In summary, lasers have a much lower probability of detection than other 
RF transmissions because of the small beam divergence and the absence of spurious 
emissions like side lobes. 
b. Visibility 
Many vendors claim that one of the reasons FSO links are secure is 
because the lasers used are in the  near- infrared band and therefore invisible and covert. 
Therefore, an enemy would not be able to detect an FSO link. While this is somewhat 
true, an FSO beam can still be detected if the enemy has the appropriate tools and 
environment to detect the beam. 
In a scene often played in the movies, a hero needs to get to the other end 
of a room to retrieve some prized treasure. It is known that this room is protected by 
motion sensors. Our hero puts on an awkward pair of goggles. At first, the room looks no 
different. Smoke is sprayed into the room. Slowly, a mesh of laser beams is revealed. Our 
hero then performs some incredible acrobatics, avoids the laser beams, and gets to the 
other end of the room without setting off the alarm. Science fiction? Maybe not. 
The goggles used by our hero may well be infrared (IR) goggles. IR 
goggles convert invisible infrared light into light that can be seen by the human eye. 
Figure 16 shows a hands-free version of the 6100 IR goggles by Electrophysics 
Corporation [Electrophysics 2003]. 
 
Figure 16.   The 6100 IR Goggles from Electrophysics Corporation  
(From: [Electrophysics 2003]) 
 
The spectral sensitivity of the 6100 IR goggles is from 0.4 to 1.3 microns. 
Visible light is from 0.4 to 0.7 microns. Therefore, normal light can still be seen through 
these goggles. This explains why our hero is able to see normally through the goggles. 
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Near-infrared light is from 0.7 to 1.5 microns. Although these goggles do not cover the 
full spectrum of near- infrared wavelengths, it will be able to sense a near-infrared laser as 
long as its wavelength is between 0.7 and 1.3 microns. Common wavelengths used in 
FSO lasers are 0.80, 0.85, and 1.55 microns. Therefore, while the 6100 IR goggles from 
Electrophysics should be able to sense lasers at 0.80 and 0.85 microns, it will not be able 
to sense lasers at 1.55 microns. 
It is left to explain why our hero had to use smoke before he could see the 
laser beams. Light from lasers is highly directional and generally only travels to where it 
is pointed at. For example, the laser pointers used in boardroom presentations use a 
visible laser. While a bright spot can be seen where the laser is pointed, we usually 
cannot see the laser light along the path from the laser pointer to the bright spot. Smoke 
particles scatter the laser beam so that some portion of the beam will be scattered towards 
an observer. A successful scatter will require that the size of the smoke particles be of the 
same order as the wavelength of the laser light. Scattering will be discussed in much 
greater detail in the section on atmospheric effects. 
Therefore, an enemy may be able to detect an FSO link if IR goggles were 
used. Some means to scatter the laser beam is needed. Smoke may be present from 
pollution, or in a wartime scenario, the smoke may come from fires. Laser beams are also 
greatly scattered by fog and haze. Therefore, a foggy day may be a good time to spot 
laser beams. 
To minimize the probability of a laser beam being detected, transmitters 
should not use excessive power. This will reduce the amount of light scattered and hence 
reduce the probability of detection. 
 
2. Probability of Intercept 
Intercepting a laser transmission is the tapping of the signal sent from the 
transmitter. While detecting the laser beam can be accomplished within or outside the 
beam, intercepting the beam will require placing the sensing device within the laser 
beam. As laser transmissions are highly directional, a sensor which relies on the scatters 
outside the beam would only receive very weak signals, which may not be sufficient to 
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extracting information. Furthermore, the scatters coming from different portions of the 
beam represent signals from different phases in time of the transmission. Therefore, 
scattered signals may interfere with one another, resulting in noise. 
The probability of intercept of a laser beam includes the probability of detection 
from within the beam and therefore depends on the beam divergence. However, 
intercepting a laser transmission usually has an additional requirement that the 
transmission should not be disrupted. This is because the laser transceivers usually have 
some form of flow control protocol to ensure that the transmitter does not flood the 
receiver. If intercepting the laser transmission blocks the signals from reaching the 
receiver, then the receiver would not request for more information from the transmitter. 
Therefore, the intercept of information would fail.   
Herein lies another distinguishing factor between RF and FSO “antennas.” RF 
antennas usually consist of a series of waveguides which are used to sense the RF 
transmissions. While some portion of the transmission is converted to electricity, much of 
the transmitted signal passes between the waveguides unchanged. FSO “antennas” on the 
other hand usually consist of a lens which focuses all the light which falls on the lens 
onto a detector which may then convert the signal to electrical form. Therefore, signals 
that encounter such a detector would be entirely blocked from the receiver and the 
intercept of further data may fail. 
Intercepting a laser transmission is difficult to achieve without disrupting it. This 
is explained by the small beam divergence of the beam. Since most of the signal falls 
within the receiver, blocking part of the beam would imply a significant amount of power 
from reaching the receiver. Even if sufficient power reaches the intended receiver such 
that it is still able to interpret the data, intelligence can be built into the receiver such that 
it knows that a sudden drop in power may be caused by an intercept. 
While intercepting a laser beam would generally disrupt the transmission, this 
may not be the case for long-haul links. A typical 0.5 milliradian FSO beam would 
extend a circle of diameter 10 meters after traveling 20 km. The size of the optics for an 
FSO receiver usually has a diameter of no more than 0.3 meters. Therefore, there is 
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sufficient opportunity for an intercepting receiver to tap the transmitted signal without 
disrupting the signal to the intended receiver. 
From the security perspective, it makes sense to have a beam with as small a 
divergence angle as possible. However, this also means difficulty in positioning the 
beam, especially for long-haul links. Therefore, many FSO systems are designed where 
not the entire beam falls within the optics of the receiver. 
 
Figure 17.   Intercepting a Long-Haul Laser Transmission 
 
Even if the entire transmit beam is focused onto the receiver, it is still possible to 
tap the signal without blocking the transmission. One way is through the use of beam 
splitters. 
 
Figure 18.   Beam Splitter Cube 
 
Figure 18 shows a 45o beam splitter cube which allows some portion of the input 
beam to pass through unchanged, while some portion of the beam will be reflected at 90o. 
The intensity of the transmitted and reflected beams add up to equal that of the input 
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beam. The relative intensity of the reflected and transmitted beams (known as the R/T 
ratio) is typically 50:50. That is, both the reflected and transmitted beams are of half the 
power of the input beam. 
While the above beam splitter cube allows some portion of the input beam to pass 
through, the received beam must be of sufficient power for the intended receiver. 
Furthermore, if the receiver is able to detect the sudden reduction in receive power, it 
may raise an alarm that the transmission has been intercepted. 
In summary, to reduce the probability of intercept of a laser transmission, the 
beam divergence should not be larger than necessary. Furthermore, it would be good if 
the receiver is capable of raising an alarm if there is a disruption or an unexpected 
reduction of power in the received laser beam. 
 
3. Probability of Exploitation 
In the field of communications security, the probability of exploitation includes 
the likelihood of the signal being decoded / deciphered, an enemy transceiver spoofing as 
a legitimate transceiver or receiver, and the enemy being able to locate the position of the 
transmitter and/or receiver. 
a. Decoding 
Most FSO systems today employ on-off keying (OOK) modulation or 
some variant. OOK is where the presence of a signal represents a binary “1”, while the 
absence of the signal represents a binary “0”. Therefore, if an enemy were able to 
intercept a laser transmission, there should be little difficulty in extracting the 1’s and 0’s. 
While it has been explained that FSO links have a low probability of intercept, there is 
still that small probability of intercept. Therefore, encrypting FSO links is still 
recommended. 
FSO is a layer 1 service in the OSI model (physical transmission). Most 
networks of today do not attempt to encrypt the layer 1 modulation. Encryption is usually 
left to the higher layers in the OSI model. This is so that even if the enemy were able to 
obtain the series of 1’s and 0’s from the physical transmission, it would be extremely 
difficult to make sense of them. 
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While it is generally accepted to leave encryption to the higher layers of 
the OSI, there are indeed methods of encrypting layer 1 physical transmissions. In the 
field of chaotic communication, the complexity of the carrier used in the transmitter is 
intentionally increased to an extent that an observer would only experience random 
signals. Popular methods of message encoding and decoding in chaotic communications 
include chaos masking, chaos shift keying, and chaos modulation [Tang 2002]. 
Synchronizing these transceivers has proved challenging, and practical implementations 
for lasers have largely been confined to fiber optic cables. The range of an FSO link 
which employs chaotic communication is expected to significantly decrease because of 
the sensitivity to changes in the signal. 
Not only are chaotic communication signals difficult to decode, they are 
also difficult to reproduce. Security proponents know that this means difficulty for an 
adversary to carry out man- in-the-middle attacks. This is where the adversary blocks the 
transmitted signal from the intended receiver and regenerates a modified version to the 
receiver. 
Chaotic communication is currently still in its infancy and is not 
recommended for use on FSO links. The main reason for this is that it results in shorter 
range, which is already a problem with current links. Furthermore, encryption provided 
by the higher OSI layers together with the low probability of intercept should be able to 
provide sufficient protection from an adversary attempting to decode the signal. 
b. Spoofing 
Spoofing is where an adversary masquerades as a friendly transceiver. A 
spoofed transmitter may send false and harmful information (compromise in data 
integrity), while a spoofed receiver may steal sensitive or cla ssified information 
(compromise in data confidentiality). 
Spoofing is usually avoided through the use of some secure authentication 
scheme. This usually involves the exchange of secret passwords. Authentication usually 
takes place all the way up at the application layer in the OSI model. 
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At the lower layers of the OSI model, authentication between transceivers 
can take place (albeit informally) through the use of encryptors. Encrypted data sent to a 
spoofed receiver would be of little use. A friendly receiver expecting to receive encrypted 
data would reject data that is either not encrypted or is incorrectly encrypted.  
The directionality of the laser beams in FSO may also reduce the 
likelihood of a spoofed transceiver. If the locations of the transceivers are known and 
they are pointed to one another, the likelihood of spoofing is low. Spoofing would require 
that the spoofed transceiver be located along the line-of-sight between the two friendly 
transceivers. 
c. Position Monitoring 
Determining the location of line-of-sight transmitters like microwave radio 
and FSO links is generally more difficult than locating omni-directional radio 
transmissions. 
The directionality of microwave and FSO links may seem to easily give 
away the direction in which the beam is coming from and going towards. However, the 
direction of an omni-directional transmitter can also be determined by scanning the 
direction in which the received signal is strongest. This also means that the direction in 
which an omni-directional transmitter is located can be determined virtually anywhere 
around the transmitter. In contrast, the direction of a line-of-sight microwave radio or 
FSO transmitter can only be determined by an interceptor located within that line-of-
sight. The more directional the link, the less opportunity there is for the interceptor to 
locate itself within that line-of-sight. Therefore, a FSO link with a typical beam 
divergence of about 0.05 degrees is less likely to reveal its position than a microwave 
radio transmission with a typical beam divergence of 2 degrees. Therefore, the 
probability of position monitoring depends on the probability of intercept of the 
transmission, which has been discussed earlier. 
Knowing the direction in which a transmitter can be located is only half 
the problem of determining the position of the transmitter. The other parameter needed is 
the distance. Using only one sensor, the distance from the sensor to the transmitter can 
only be estimated if the transmit power is known. Since the transmit signal is attenuated 
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with distance, the distance of the transmitter from the sensor can be estimated by 
knowing the atmospheric attenuation as well as the received power. For example, if the 
transmitter is known to emit a laser of power 100 mW, the atmospheric attenuation is 3 
dB/km (halfing of power per km), the received power is 50 mW, then the transmitter 
would be estimated to be 1 km away. 
If the transmit power or the atmospheric attenuation is not known, a more 
accurate method of determining the location of the transmitter is by pinpointing through 
the use of two or more sensors. Figure 19 illustrates how two sensors can pinpoint an 
omni-directional transmitter. The two sensors are spaced apart and individually determine 
the direction (bearing) in which the transmission is strongest. The intersection of these 
bearings would be the location of the transmitter. 
 
Figure 19.   Pinpointing an Omni-Directional Transmitter 
 
The same pinpointing method can be applied to directional antennas. Such 
antennas with higher power and longer ranges can be more easily pinpointed. This is 
because even though directional antennas like that used for microwave radio have small 
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divergence angles of about 2 degrees, the spread of the signal quickly increases with 
distance. This is illustrated in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20.   Pinpointing a Directional Transmitter 
 
The smaller the divergence of the transmit signal, the harder it is to 
pinpoint the location of the transmitter. The width of a microwave transmission with a 
divergence of 2 degrees is roughly 350 m after 10 km. This should give sufficient spacing 
for the sensors to estimate the location of the transmitter. An FSO transmitter with a 
typical beam divergence of 0.05 degrees would have a beam width of less than 10 m after 
traveling 10 km. This separation of sensors may not be sufficient to give a good estimate 
of the location of the transmitter when considering the errors in determining the direction 
of the transmitter. 
It should be highlighted that directional transmissions also give an 
adversary a rough indication of the location of the receiver. In this case, the more 
directional the transmission, the easier it would be to locate the receiver. Therefore, 
directional transmissions like FSO and microwave radio give an adversary a better idea 
of where the receiver is located, while an omni-directional transmitter does not reveal 
this. 
In the earlier section on the probability of detection of FSO transmissions, 
it was presented that the invisible near- infrared lasers used by FSO systems can still be 
“seen” from outside the laser beam through the use of special electro-optical devices 
which convert the invisible wavelengths to visible ones. This requires a reasonable 
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amount of dispersion of the laser, possibly by fog or smoke. This “visibility” of laser 
beams may directly divulge the location of FSO transmitters and/or receivers. 
 
4. Denial-of-Service 
The last Electronic Counter-Counter Measure is the prevention of denial-of-
service attacks. In ECCM, denial-of-service largely refers to jamming. Jamming is the 
sending of an interference signal to a receiver, such that the receiver is no longer able to 
perform its function because of a decrease in signal-to-noise ratio. While jamming 
attempts to increase the noise level in the receiver, another way to decrease the signal-to-
noise ratio is by decreasing the signal that reaches the receiver. The fact that FSO links 
are inherently line-of-sight links because of the lasers used implies that it is possible to 
block the lasers from reaching their intended receivers. Denial-of-service also includes 
the probability of an adversary destroying a communications system. This final sub-
section takes a look at whether there can be an equivalent to the High-speed Anti-
Radiation Missiles (HARM) which are able to lock-on and destroy RF communication 
antennas. 
a. Jamming 
It is the challenge of communication receivers to extract the transmitted 
signal out of the unwanted noise signals. It then comes naturally that if an adversary 
wants to disrupt communications, he can introduce “noise” to the receiver such that it is 
no longer able to distinguish the wanted signal from the noise. 
Bandpass filters used in most communication receivers to reject unwanted 
noise can also be effective against jamming. As FSO systems typically only use a single 
frequency, any other received frequency should be discarded as noise. This presents 
difficulty for the jammer as it needs to know the frequency in use. Sending jamming 
signals at other frequencies would be simply discarded by the receiver. 
If the jammer knows the frequency in use, one simple method of reducing 
the probability of interference by the jammer is to reduce the Field-of-View of the 
receiver (sometimes called the field-of-regard). 
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Figure 21.   FSO Receiver with a Wide Field-of-View 
 
Figure 21 shows an FSO receiver with a wide field-of-view (FOV). There 
is more opportunity for a jammer to send its jamming signal into the receiver. The 
jamming signal gets focused onto the detector of the FSO receiver by the receiver’s lens. 
 
Figure 22.   FSO Receiver with a Narrow Field-of-View 
 
As shown in Figure 22, if the lens and detector are recessed into the cavity 
of the receiver, a much narrower field-of-view results. A jammer not in the FOV will not 
be able to jam the receiver because its jamming signal does not enter the receiver. Typical 
figures for FOV are from tenths of degrees up to 15 degrees or even more in some cases 
[Schenk 2000] [Cowan 2000] [Oppenhäuser 2001]. A smaller FOV is more resistant to 
jamming. However, a small FOV would represent difficulty in detecting the signal from 
the legitimate transmitter. Where possible, a wide FOV may be used to establish 
communications, while a narrow FOV may be used once the location of the transmitter 
has been established. 
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b. Blocking the Signal 
While jamming attempts to increase the noise level in the receiver, another 
way to decrease the signal- to-noise ratio is by decreasing the signal that reaches the 
receiver. The fact that FSO links are inherently line-of-sight links because of the lasers 
used implies that it is possible to block the lasers from reaching their intended receivers.  
Blocking a laser transmission can be as simple as mobilizing some 
platform to block the laser beam. While a solid and opaque platform is ideal to use for 
blocking the beam, strategically smoke from fires may be able to sufficiently reduce the 
strength of the signal that reaches the receiver. The scattering of a laser signal will be 
discussed in much greater detail in the section on atmospheric effects. 
c. Destruction of Transceivers 
Denial-of-service also includes the probability of an adversary destroying 
a communications system. Evidently, if an adversary knows the geographical coordinates 
of a transceiver, a bombardment of shells could potentially destroy the transceiver. 
However, bombarding a certain position would usually require some degree of proximity, 
while missiles and other long-range munitions may not be accurate enough to destroy a 
small transceiver. 
High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM) like the AGM-88 have been 
successfully deployed by U.S. Defense Forces in destroying enemy radar-equipped air 
defense systems. The HARM seeks and destroys the radars by locking in on the signals 
emitted by these radars. The HARM was designed to seek and destroy antennas that emit 
RF signals, but not at laser frequencies. 
The original AGM-114 Hellfire I missiles, previously used on the U.S. 
Comanche and Apache helicopters, were laser-seeking missiles. A laser beam is aimed at 
the target either by a gunner on the helicopter, or by ground forces. The laser pulses on 
and off in a particular coded pattern. Before giving the firing signal, a computer tells the 
missile's control system the specific pulse pattern of the laser. The missile has a laser 
seeker on its nose that detects the laser light reflecting off the target. In this way, the 
missile can “see” where the target is. The guidance system calculates which way the 
missile needs to turn in order to head straight for the reflected laser light. 
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Figure 23.   Deployment Scenario of a Laser-Seeking Missile 
 
It would seem that a combination of the technologies of the HARM and 
Hellfire missiles would give a missile that can seek and destroy an FSO transmitter. 
However, once again, the small divergence angle of a laser beam proves advantageous 
for FSO. The HARM seeks a radar signal which is broadcast throughout the airspace, 
while the Hellfire requires a good reflection of the laser beam from the target so that it 
can “see” the laser beam. 
FSO transmitters only direct their laser beams towards the receiver. A 
seeker outside of the beam is unable to detect the laser. Missiles are unlikely to be able to 
“ride” a narrow laser beam towards the transmitter because of the instabilities of flight. A 
slight shift in the position of the missile would cause it to lose the laser signal and hence 
the position of its target. Furthermore, a break in transmission from the transmitter would 
also cause the missile to lose its target. 
 
E. FREE-SPACE LOSS 
Free space loss is the signal attenuation that is caused by beam divergence. It is a 
measure of the transmitted signal that is received by the receiving “antenna.” Recall the 
example of a transmitter and receiver which are 20 km apart. If the transmitter has a 
beam divergence of 2 degrees, then the circle formed at the receiver’s end would have a 
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radius of 349.1m. Theoretically, in order not to have any free-space loss, the receiver 
could be built so that the entire received signal would be received by the receiver. This 
would require the receiver to have a diameter of almost 700m! Even the largest satellite 
dish on earth is less than 50m across. 
Because of the way lasers are generated, and with the added use of collimators, 
lasers can be constrained to very small divergence angles. In our example of a laser 
transmitter with a divergence angle of 2 arcseconds, the receiver would need to be of 
radius 0.1m, or 10 cm, which is a practical size for many deployments. 




If a microwave receiver of the same size as our laser receiver was used to receive 
the signal from the microwave transmitter which has a divergence angle of 2 degrees, 
then 












   = 0.99999992 
Engineers experienced at calculating the free-space loss of RF and microwave 
systems will know that free-space loss is traditionally calculated by first assuming 
isotropic (omni-directional) antennas, and thereafter considering the directionality of the 
antennas by including the gain factors for the transmitter and the receiver. It should be 
found that this is similar in concept to the above calculations where the beam divergence 
of the transmitter is known. 
Once again, the area of the beam at the receiver is simplified to be that of a flat 
circle although in practice, it should be spherical in shape. The above calculation is only 
meant to illustrate that low free-space loss can be attained by FSO systems because of the 
low beam divergence. 
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F. POWER CONSUMPTION 
The process of generating a highly coherent laser beam is usually very inefficient.  
The neodymium (Nd:YAG) laser is only about one percent efficient, while the popular 
helium-neon (He-Ne) laser is only about 0.001 percent efficient. Fortuitously, 
semiconductor lasers, which generate light by direct conversion of electrical current to 
photons, are very efficient, achieving 20 to 50 percent efficiencies.  
In comparison, power amplifiers for the Very Low Frequency (VLF) up to the 
High Frequency (HF) bands are highly efficient, with conversion efficiencies from 85 to 
90 percent. However, Microwave amplifier biasing arrangements have typical conversion 
efficiencies of only between 10 and 20 percent. Therefore, while microwave amplifiers 
are much more efficient than the Nd:YAG and He-Ne lasers, they are generally less 
efficient than semiconductor lasers. 
Researchers at NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) have applied the 
methodologies used in lower frequency amplifiers to the higher frequency microwave 
amplifiers to attain a 49.7% direct current (DC) to radio frequency (RF) conversion 
efficiency [Obenshain 2003]. With this, microwave amplifiers can equal or better the DC-
to-RF conversion efficiencies of semiconductor lasers. 
It is critical to determine where the remaining energy goes, which inevitably ends 
up as waste heat and must be removed from the laser system. In some lasers, like the 
hydrogen fluoride (HF) laser, the exhaust gases carry away the heat. In other lasers, such 
as the Nd:YAG or semiconductor laser, some method must be used to extract the heat 
from the  laser, such as flowing cooled water within the laser. If it is allowed to remain in 
the laser, the performance of the laser is likely to be degraded or, in the extreme, the laser 
may be damaged. Dissipating heat in a spacecraft can pose serious problems.  
As analyzed in the previous section on bit error rate (BER), laser systems usually 
have lower BER than other RF systems. This is due to the high spectral purity of laser 
signals which give laser systems a high signal- to-noise ratio. In RF systems which desire 
a high signal-to-noise ratio (e.g. QAM), much higher power is needed to attain low BER. 
Therefore, in order for an RF system to have a BER value comparable to that in laser 
systems, much higher power consumption is needed. 
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Yet another reason why laser systems consume less power is because of the low 
free space loss. Since lasers have small divergence angles, they are better able to focus 
the transmitted energy towards the receiver for power-efficient communication. RF 
systems on the other hand, have much higher divergence figures and hence much of the 
transmitted energy of RF systems does not reach the receiver. This represents a waste of 
power, and hence more power needs to be consumed by the RF transmitter in order for 
sufficient energy to reach the receiver. 
Having low power consumption is especially important in mobile military 
platforms as the power source is usually limited. This can mean lower fuel or battery 
consumption on planes and ships, or a decreased solar array requirement for satellites. 
Typical power consumption figures for communication lasers are from 100 mW to a few 
Watts for laser with output powers of 30 to 200 mW [Biswas 1999] [CBL 2003] [Gill 
1997] [Toyoda 2000]. 
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IV. LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES 
A. ATMOSPHERIC EFFECTS 
 
1. Effects of the Atmosphere  
The various gases in the atmosphere absorb and scatter EMR at different 
wavelengths and to various extents. Figure 24 illustrates an experiment which may have 
been carried out by students in a physics class. This experiment starts off with a white 
light source being split into an even spectrum of colors by a prism. 
However, when a glass canister containing a certain type of gas is placed between 
the light source and the prism, dark bands are seen within the spectrum. These dark bands 
represent the wavelengths of light which have been absorbed or scattered by the gas. It is 
also found that different gases and particles absorb and scatter light at different 
wavelengths. Therefore, the location of the dark bands is different when different gases 
and particles are used. 
 
Figure 24.   Absorption and Scattering of Light by Gases (From: [Colorado 2003]) 
 
a. Absorption 
The above experiment illustrates the absorption and scattering of visible 
light. This phenomenon applies similarly to the invisible light waves in the infrared and 
ultraviolet bands. One main difference with infrared and ultraviolet light is that they are 
more readily absorbed by gases which can be found in our atmosphere. Figure 25 
illustrates the absorptance of the various atmospheric gases with respect to the 
wavelength of EMR. 
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Figure 25.   Absorptance of EMR by Atmospheric Gases (After: [Fleagle 1980]) 
 
There are a total of 6 graphs in Figure 25. The first 5 graphs show the 
absorptance of methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), oxygen and ozone (O2 & O3), 
carbon dioxide (CO2), and water molecules (H2O) respectively. The last graph shows the 
composite absorptance of all these gases and is basically the absorptance of the 
atmosphere. 
The wavelengths of visible light are approximately from 0.4 to 0.7 
microns (mm). As can be seen from Figure 25, visible light is only slightly absorbed by 
oxygen and ozone. The near infrared wavelengths (0.7 to 1.5 microns), which find 
popular use in FSO systems, have certain bands of wavelengths which are greatly 
absorbed by water molecules. The other infrared bands (above 1.5 microns) are affected 
by almost all the gases listed at various wavelengths at varying degrees. Ultraviolet light 
below 0.3 microns is greatly absorbed by oxygen and ozone. 
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Figure 26 zooms in on the visible and infrared EMR bands while showing 
the transmittance of the atmosphere instead of the absorptance. It is noted that the largest 
hindrance to transmittance is caused by water molecules. Absorption of visible and near-
infrared radiation in the gaseous atmosphere is primarily due to H2O, O2, O3, and CO2. 
Three dotted lines are marked in the figure to show the wavelengths used by many 
current FSO systems. These lines represent the wavelengths of 0.80, 0.85, and 1.55 
microns. It is seen that these wavelengths have been chosen for high atmospheric 
transmittance. 
 
Figure 26.   Visible and Infrared Atmospheric Transmittance (After: [Short 2002]) 
 
Figure 27 allows a comparison of the effect the absorptance of atmosphere 
has on visible and infrared EMR bands in comparison with today’s microwave 
transmissions. While there are limited windows of higher transmittance within the 
infrared band, microwave frequencies are only minimally absorbed by the atmospheric 
gases. Attenuation of microwave frequencies in the 2 to 14 GHz frequency range is 
approximately 0.01 dB/mile, which is not significant. 
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Figure 27.   Visible, Infrared and Microwave Atmospheric Transmittance  
(From: [Short 2002]) 
 
b. Scattering 
Other than absorbing light, the atmosphere scatters light as well. 
Scattering is caused by atmospheric molecules or particles which have dimensions of the 
same order or smaller than the wavelength of the incident light. For FSO, fog, haze and 
pollution (aerosols) are of concern because of the closeness in size of these particles to 
the wavelengths used in FSO systems. There are three forms of scattering:  Raman, 
Rayleigh and Mie scattering. 
Raman scattering is caused by atmospheric molecules or particles which 
are of sizes from 10% to 150% of the wavelength of the incident light. The photons of 
light interact with these particles in such a way that energy is either gained or lost. Since 
the energy of these photons determine the frequency of light, Raman scattering causes 
light emissions which are of different frequency from the incident light. The intensity of 
the scattered light due to Raman scattering is much lower than that from Rayleigh 
scattering. The American Institute of Physics [Weber 2000] approximates the magnitude 
of Raman scattering to be 106 to 108 times lower than that of Rayleigh scattering. Raman 
scattering is usually negligible unless a powerful laser source is used. 
Rayleigh scattering is caused by atmospheric molecules or particles which 
are of magnitude less than 10% the wavelength of the incident light. The energy of the 
incident photons of light are unchanged by these particles and therefore the emitted light 
is of the same frequency as the incident light. The intensity of Rayleigh scattering is 













where  IS = intensity of scattering 
 I0 = incident intensity 
 a = polarizability of particle 
 l = wavelength of incident radiation 
 r = distance, center of scattering to detector 
 q = angle incident /scattered ray 
What is interesting about the Rayleigh scattering formula is that the 
intensity of Rayleigh scattering is inversely proportional to the fourth power of the 
wavelength of the incident light. This implies that light of shorter wavelength (higher 
frequency) experience substantially higher Rayleigh scattering than light of longer 
wavelengths (lower frequency). 
Rayleigh scattering explains the colors of the sky. Firstly, the atmosphere 
certainly scatters the light from the sun. If it did not, then the sky would always look dark 
unless you are looking directly at the sun. Blue light, which is of shorter wavelength, is 
more readily dispersed than red light. Therefore, the sky looks blue during the day. 
During sunrise and sunset, the light from the sun has to travel a much further distance. 
Light of shorter wavelength would already have been scattered before it reaches an 
observer. Therefore, what the observer sees during sunrise and sunset are the longer 
wavelengths of red, orange, and/or yellow. 
Rayleigh scattering depends on the size of the scattering particles 
(magnitude needs to be less than 10% of wavelength). Therefore, using the Rayleigh 
formula to compare the scattering intensities for microwave and FSO is difficult because 
of the big difference in wavelengths. However, comparing the scattering intensities of 
different wavelengths within the FSO band is possible since the difference in magnitude 
of the wavelengths within this band is not large. Knowing that the wavelengths of FSO 
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systems in the near- infrared band range from 0.7 to 1.5 microns, the maximum difference 























This means that even if two different frequencies within the near- infrared 
band were carefully chosen so that they have equally low absorption by the atmosphere, 
the range of the higher-frequency system could be up to 20 times shorter than the lower-
frequency system due to Rayleigh scattering. 
Mie scattering is similar to Rayleigh scattering in that the scattered light is 
of the same frequency as the incident light. However, the distribution of the scattered 
light is different for Mie scattering because of a larger scattering particle size (roughly of 
the same order of magnitude as the wavelength of the incident light). 
 
Figure 28.   Comparison Between Rayleigh and Mie Scattering  
(From: [Meyer 1994]) 
 
Figure 28 illustrates the differences between Rayleigh and Mie scattering 
for an incident light which hits a particle from left to right. For Rayleigh scattering, the 
intensity of the scattered light is largely uniform, except for the scatter at right angles to 
the incident light, which is half the intensity of the forward scatter intensity. 
In Mie scattering, the intensity of the scattered light is greatest in the 
direction of the incident light. This difference increases with the size of the scattering 
particle. Therefore, the loss of source light intensity due to scattering actually decreases 
with an increase in the scattering particle size. 
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Therefore, FSO transmissions in the near- infrared band are scattered 
substantially by fog and clouds which have water droplets that are approximately of the 
same order of magnitude as its wavelength. However, FSO is less affected by rain, 
because the size of rain drops are much larger. Recall that it was explained through 
Figure 27 that microwave frequencies are less affected by the absorption of atmospheric 
gases. However, the wavelength of microwave transmissions are of the same order of 
magnitude as rain drops. Therefore, microwave transmissions, especially those of 
frequencies above 11 GHz, are greatly scattered by rain. 
c. Dispersion 
Dispersion is the process by which an electromagnetic signal propagating 
in a physical medium is degraded because the various wave components (i.e. frequencies) 
of the signal have different propagation velocities within the physical medium. As 
explained earlier in this report, practical lasers do not just emit one frequency, but a small 
range of frequencies. Dispersion therefore causes a laser signal to spread across time. 
Dispersion can also occur in an ideal laser transmission (i.e. a laser which 
only emits one single frequency). If such an ideal laser beam passes through a uniform 
medium, the entire beam is slowed but the pattern of phases still moves together. In a 
non-uniform medium of different densities and temperatures, however, some parts of the 
beam are slowed more than others, leading to distortions in the uniform wavefront (i.e. 
dispersion). 
Figure 29 illustrates dispersion effects on a rectangular source pulse. The 
received signal would have a lower peak power than the source because of the spreading. 
The attenuated signal needs to be higher than some arbitrarily set threshold so that a “1” 




Figure 29.   Dispersion of Rectangular Pulse 
 
The received signal is also spread across time. This poses a limitation on 
the data rate that can be transmitted. This is illustrated in Figure 30, where the source is 
trying to send a pulse train to the receiver. 
 
Figure 30.   Dispersion of a Pulse Train 
 
Because of the overlap in the received signal, the receiver will not be able 
to separate the pulses and the pulse train would be incorrectly interpreted by the receiver 
as a long period of a high (“1”) signal. 
 
2. Combating Atmospheric Effects 
a. Adaptive Optics 
The problem of dispersion is also encountered by astronomers who need 
to study the faint and blur images from the distant galaxies. Figure 31 shows such an 
image being enhanced by using Adaptive Optics (AO). 
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Figure 31.   Nuclear Region of Galaxy NGC 7469 with and without  
Adaptive Optics (From: [CfAO 2003]) 
 
All AO systems work by determining the shape of the distorted wavefront, 
and use an “adaptive” optical element (usually a deformable mirror) to restore the 
uniform wavefront by applying an opposite canceling distortion. Current AO systems are 
able to update the shape of the deformable mirror several hundred times a second. 
 
Figure 32.   Adaptive Optics System used for Astronomy (From: [CfAO 2003]) 
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Astronomers make use of a known light source (labeled as a reference 
beacon in Figure 32) like an adjacent star to determine how much the light from the target 
has been deformed. With this, the system will be able to know how to deform the mirror 
such that the expected signal from the reference beacon can be received. 
However, in our application of using a laser source for communication, 
the light source from the transmitter is well understood. Therefore, there is no need for 
this reference beacon. The received laser signal can be duplicated to the wavefront sensor 
so that the required changes can be made to the deformable mirror. 
Using adaptive optics, a received laser signal can be reconstructed, 
resulting in better range and allowing higher data rates for the FSO system. In early 2002, 
the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) used adaptive optics to achieve a 
2.5 Gbps laser link over a distance of 28 km. The tests represent one of the longest 
terrestrial high-capacity FSO links ever achieved to date. 
b. Wavelength Variation Techniques 
As seen earlier in this section, different atmospheric conditions affect 
different FSO wavelengths to different extents. The following sub-sections explore how 
this knowledge can be leveraged on to provide resistance against atmospheric attenuation. 
(1) Tunable Lasers. While most lasers will only operate on 
discrete wavelengths, some types can be tuned over a range of wavelengths, giving an 
additional agility against atmospheric attenuation. Examples of tunable lasers include the 
titanium sapphire (Ti:S) laser, the chromium:LiSAF laser (where the host material is a 
crystal of LiSrAlF6), and the chromium:LiCAF lasers (where the host material is a crystal 
of LiCaAlF6). Table 2 shows the tuning range of these three lasers. 
Laser Type  Lasing Ion Wavelength Range (microns) 
Titanium Sapphire Ti3+ 0.66 to 1.18 
Chromium LiSAF Cr3+ 0.78 to 0.92 
Chromium LiCAF Cr3+ 0.72 to 0.84 
 
Table 2 Typical Tunable Lasers [Rogers 1997] 
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Tunable lasers are seen as useful to adapt to the weather. Although 
the effect that water molecules have on particular wavelengths of EMR is quite well 
understood, water in the liquid state may affect the different wavelengths of EMR to 
different extents. This is because the size of the water droplets in the atmosphere (fog, 
clouds, and rain) may range anywhere from 1 mm to more than 5 mm. Tunable lasers 
allows the transmitter to use a frequency which is less hindered by the water droplets in 
the atmosphere. 
(2) Nonlinear Optical Materials. Nonlinear optical (NLO) 
materials respond nonlinearly to light passing through them and can generate new 
wavelengths of light. NLO materials are the subject of contemporary research. The most 
common is the frequency doubling crystals that cut the wavelength in half, so that the 
infrared emission of a Nd:YAG laser (at 1064 nm) can be converted into a visible beam 
(at 532 nm). Frequency doubling can be fairly efficient, with reported values of 50 to 80 
percent conversion from the fundamental wavelength to the doubled wavelength. Other 
nonlinear systems, like optical parametric oscillators (OPO), can generate a tunable 
output. While the technical details of such systems are beyond the scope of this study, 
they highlight the possibility of wavelength variability or the ability to tune the output 
wavelength of the laser. However, at this time, only a limited number of NLO materials 
are available. The efficiency at which they operate tends to be low. Also, obtaining 
efficient nonlinear effects requires high peak powers from the laser beam, which can 
damage the NLO material. Research in material science is likely to push back these 
limits. 
Another NLO effect that can be used for wavelength shifting is 
Stimulated Raman Scattering (SRS). Raman scattering occurs when a beam of light 
passes through a material and excites a very weak transition within the material, leaving 
some of its energy. The emitted light is shifted to a longer wavelength. If the process is 
stimulated in a method analogous to the operation of a laser, a significant amount of the 
light can be shifted to the new wavelength. SRS is a complicated process beyond the 
scope of this study but offers great potential for laser systems. 
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(3) Multiline Emission Lasers. Some types of lasers operate on 
several different wavelengths simultaneously, such as the argon ion laser that emits most 
of its light at 488 nm and 514.5 nm. Multiline emissions are effectively redundant links 
which may provide some resiliency to atmospheric attenuation. This is more likely to 
succeed in such lasers where the emissions have wavelengths which are considerably 
separated. One disadvantage of multiline emission lasers is that it generally does not have 
the flexibility of selecting the frequency to transmit once the laser has been chosen.  
(4) Redundant Frequency Links. A no-frills method of 
providing varied wavelength transmissions is the use of redundant frequency links. The 
redundant link may be another laser transmitter operating at a different frequency. This is 
not unlike the multiline emission lasers described earlier. However, redundant links do 
not require the use of special lasers which emit multiple frequencies. The frequency of 
the redundant links should be chosen so that both links can provide maximum resiliency 
against atmospheric effects. This would usually require that the links use substantially 
different frequencies. 
An alternative redundancy option is to use a non-FSO link as 
standby to an FSO link. Microwave links are a suitable candidate for such a standby link 
as it is largely immune to fog, FSO’s biggest adversary. FSO, on the other hand, is more 
resilient to rain, which poses a big problem for microwave. Furthermore, fog and rain do 
not occur at the same time. Therefore, FSO and microwave are good complements for 
one another. A disadvantage of using a microwave link as standby is that it operates at a 
lower frequency and would usually provide a lower data rate. Therefore, falling back on a 
microwave backup link could mean a drop in data throughput. 
Airfiber [Bloom 2003] has a product called the Hybrid FSO/Radio 
(HFR) which combines the use of a 785 nm FSO link with a 60 GHz (5 mm wavelength) 
microwave transmission. Airfiber claims that its HFR product is able to provide 99.999% 
carrier grade wireless service. 
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Figure 33.   Airfiber’s Hybrid FSO/Radio with a 13- inch Parabolic Dish for  
Microwave Transmission (From: [Bloom 2003]) 
 
c. Spatially Diverse Redundant Links 
A redundant link which has been separated in space from the primary link 
is not seen as an effective solution against atmospheric conditions. This is because 
weather conditions which cover either the transmitter or the receiver will hinder all links 
going in or out of these transceive rs. However, there are still scenarios where spatially-
diverse links can effectively provide alternate routes for communication. 
Figure 34 shows an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) trying to send data 
to its mother ship via an FSO link. However, the mother ship is engulfed in fog, so not 
only is its direct link blocked by the fog, a redundant link via a satellite would also not be 
able to be transmitted to the mother ship. 
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Figure 34.   Ineffective Spatially Diverse FSO Links 
 
If the atmospheric condition only blocks one of the redundant links, then 
the alternate link may be used to transmit data. Figure 35 shows a reconnaissance plane 
which is flying above some thick clouds that block its direct laser path to the mother ship. 
However, it is able to use a satellite to transmit its data since the path between the 
satellite and the mother ship is not blocked. 
 
Figure 35.   Effective Spatially Diverse FSO Links 
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d. Increasing Laser Power 
An obvious solution to atmospheric attenuation is to increase the transmit 
power. This raises issues on the safety of these lasers, which will be discussed in a later 
section. 
Products from Airfiber [Airfiber 2003] and LightPointe [LightPointe 
2003] automatically adjust their laser power depending on the strength of the signal at the 
receiver’s end. 
 
3. Achievable Range and Bandwidth 
Atmospheric absorption and scattering causes a laser to lose its power. Therefore, 
the receiver must be close enough to the transmitter so that sufficient power from the 
transmitter is able to reach the receiver. LightPointe’s 2.5 Gbps FSO systems are limited 
to 1 km, the 155 Mbps systems are limited to 2 km, while the products with data rates of 
52 Mbps and less can go up to 4 km [LightPointe 2003]. 
The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), had in early 2002, 
demonstrated a 28 km FSO link between the Laboratory (in Livermore, CA) and Mount 
Diablo under the Secure Air-Optic Transport and Routing Network (SATRN) program. 
The tests represent one of the longest terrestrial high-capacity FSO links ever achieved. 
Data was transmitted at 2.5 Gbps with the aid of adaptive optics. The wavelength and 
power used was not reported, although it was said to be optical, and that “The laser 
beams used for communication are not visible or harmful in any way.” Bit error rates 
were also quoted as “quite reasonable for an unoptimized system.” Researches also claim 
to have gained experience with operation in freezing temperatures, winds up to 40 mph, 
low-visibility conditions and light fog [Johnston 2002]. 
If there were little or no atmosphere, then the range would largely only be limited 
by free space loss (the loss of power because not all of the sender’s beam reaches the 
receiver). The European Space Agency (ESA) had in November 2001 established the first 
laser communications data link between satellites. The Artemis (Advanced Relay 
Technology Mission) satellite was in a parking orbit at 31,000 km, while the SPOT 4 
satellite was orbiting at an altitude of 832 km. Links were established 4 times, lasting 4 to 
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20 minutes, where data was transferred at a rate of 50 Mbps. This was using the SILEX 
(Semiconductor laser Inter-satellite Link Experiment) system. 
The average distance between the satellites during communication was 38,500 
km. This huge distance of transmission is possible as there is practically no atmosphere in 
space, and therefore no atmospheric absorption or scattering. The bit error rate for this 
space link was reported to be consistently in the range of 10-9 to 10-10. Beam divergence 
was approximately 2 arcseconds (0.000556 degrees), and the wavelength used was 
around 0.8 mm [Oppenhäuser 2001]. 
 
B. DIRECTIONAL PRECISION 
As discussed in Chapter III, lasers have a very small beam divergence. While this 
provides greater security against eavesdroppers, it also means that it is much more 
difficult to point the laser beam at a receiver. 
Figure 36 illustrates the beam pattern at the receiver end for a transmitter with a 
pointing resolution equal to the beam divergence of q. A pointing resolution of q implies 
that the beam can only be shifted by an angle of q in either the x or y direction.  
 
Figure 36.   Beam Pattern at Receiver with Pointing Resolution of q 
 
While this may seem to provide continual coverage of the receiver’s space, in 
practice, gaps will form in a pattern of beams if the pointing resolution of the transmitter 
were only q. These gaps mean that the transmitter will not be able to effectively point its 




Figure 37.   Gaps in Beam Pattern with Pointing Resolution of q 
 
It should be found that the pointing resolution of a laser transmitter should be at 
most half the beam divergence. This is so that the gaps as described earlier can be “filled-
in.” 
 
Figure 38.   Gaps Filled- in by Beams with Pointing Resolution of q/2 
 
By the above analysis, the FSO systems which are available today, which have a 
typical beam divergence of 0.5 milliradian, will require a pointing resolution of at most 
0.25 milliradian (~0.014 degree). The SILEX laser system by the ESA, which are 




degree) [Oppenhäuser 2001]. Therefore, the pointing resolution required of the laser 
transmitter would be at most 1 arcsecond (~0.00028 degree). 
Therefore, while a beam of small divergence allows greater security and more 
efficient placement of energy (as discussed earlier), this has to be matched by a system 
which allows the laser beam to be intricately focused onto the receiver. 
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Of course, if the security and received energy are not crucial in a particular FSO 
system, then the beam divergence can be allowed to be bigger (possibly through 
adjustments in the collimators). This will allow a less stringent pointing resolution 
requirement. Further analysis of the pointing requirement will be discussed in the section 
on Acquisition, Pointing and Tracking (APT) systems. 
 
C. LINE-OF-SIGHT OBSTRUCTIONS 
Like all line-of-sight links (e.g. microwave radio), FSO links may be obstructed 
by objects such as buildings, trees and planes. However, because of the small beam and 
high data rates typical of FSO links, FSO links may also be affected by smaller objects 
like birds. 
Error correction is seen as the most effective solution against temporal 
obstructions like flying birds. However, spatially diverse links should be employed when 
obstructions are expected to occur for extended periods of time. 
Figure 39 shows an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) whose direct link to its 
mother ship is blocked by some trees. However, it is still able to send data to its mother 
ship via satellite. 
 
Figure 39.   Spatial Diversity to Overcome Line-of-Sight Obstructions 
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D. LASER SAFETY 
Laser beams contain energy in the form of electromagnetic radiation that travels 
at the speed of light and has no mass. Continuous Wave (CW) output is usually 
characterized by the power in the beam measured in Watts, while pulsed output is 
characterized by the energy in each pulse, in Joules. Repetitive pulsed systems are also 
characterized by their average power. 
All of the laser power is concentrated in a small solid angle due to the narrow 
beam. This means that even small lasers, like the helium neon (He-Ne) lasers frequently 
used as pointers, have output beams that are brighter than the sun. Here the term 
brightness is rigorously used to mean the amount of power being emitted per unit area of 
the source per solid angle. 
 
1. Human Exposure to Lasers  
Human exposure to lasers pose a greater danger to the eyes than any other part of 
the body. A basic knowledge of the parts of the eye is required to understand laser safety. 
 
Figure 40.   Parts of the Eye 
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Figure 41 shows a laser beam entering the human eye. The laser first contacts the 
cornea, followed by the aqueous fluid, the lens, the vitreous humor, and finally the retina, 
which allows the eye to see the light. What injury occurs to the eye depends on the 
wavelength of the laser. 
 
Figure 41.   Penetration of the Eye by Lasers 
 
a. Near Ultraviolet (0.3 – 0.4 mm) 
The cornea, aqueous humor, and lens absorb ultraviolet radiation of these 
wavelengths and the principal absorber is the lens. Photochemical processes denature 
proteins in the lens resulting in the formation of cataracts. Cataracts are basically the 
clouding of the lens. As this clouding is opaque, this hinders the vision of the eye. 
Cataracts can be treated by removing the old lens material and replacing it with a flexible 
plastic lens. 
 
b. Far Ultraviolet (0.1 – 0.3 mm) & Far Infrared (1.4 – 100.0 mm) 
The surface of the cornea absorbs these wavelengths producing 
photokeratitis (keratitis refers to an inflammation of the cornea). Photokeratitis is a 
temporary condition because the corneal tissues regenerate very quickly. However, deep 
cornea burns are permanent, although corneal transplants are possible. Far infrared 
wavelengths may penetrate deeper and lead to the development of cataracts resulting 
from the heating of proteins in the lens. 
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c. Visible Light & Near Infrared (0.4 – 1.4 mm) 
The cornea, aqueous humor, lens, and vitreous humor are called the ocular 
media. The ocular media are transparent to electromagnetic radiation of these 
wavelengths. 
 
Figure 42.   Wavelength Transmission of the Ocular Media 
 
As can be seen from Figure 42, the ocular media is transparent not only to 
visible light, but also to a large part of the near infrared band (shown as the invisible 
range in the figure). Furthermore, the focusing effects of the cornea and lens will increase 
the irradiance of these wavelengths on the retina by up to 100,000 times. It should be 
noted that this focusing also applies to the near infrared wavelengths even though humans 
are not capable of seeing these wavelengths. 
For visible light (0.4 – 0.7 mm), the aversion reflex of the eye causes a 
person to turn away from a bright light source. This takes 0.25 seconds, and therefore 
reduces exposure to these wavelengths. This reflex will not provide protection if the 
intensity of the laser is great enough to produce damage in less than 0.25 seconds or 
when light in the near infrared band is used, as the eye is insensitive to these 
wavelengths. 
Many products have been labeled as “eye-safe” as long as they do not use 
lasers which belong to the visible or near- infrared wavelengths. Indeed, the other 
wavelengths are unlikely to cause retina burns. However, as seen from the previous 
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sections, much damage may be caused to the eye even though these products have been 
misleadingly labeled as “eye-safe.” 
 
2. Laser Standards Organizations  
Organization Jurisdiction What they classify 
 
CDRH 




Part of the FDA 
 









Recognized by U.S. 

















Much of the world; 
Generally associated 
with the CE Mark (the 







Product and user 
safety 
 
Table 3 Laser Standards Organizations 
 
 Table 3 shows the standards organizations for lasers, their jurisdiction, and 
what they classify. CDRH and ANSI have jurisdictions in the U.S., while the IEC is an 
international standards organization.  
 
3. Laser Safety Standards  
Each of the standards organizations mentioned earlier have slightly different 
criteria for classifying laser products. However, all of them categorize lasers into 4 
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Table 4 Classification of Lasers 
 
The parameters used to classify lasers are: 
i. Laser output energy or power 
ii. Radiation wavelengths 
iii. Exposure duration 
iv. Cross-sectional area of the laser beam at the point of interest 
v. Accessible emission limit 
The IEC has classifications which distinguish whether an optical aid was used in 
viewing the laser. An aid may be a telescope, binoculars, or fiber optics loupe. These aids 
magnify the irradiance of the incident laser onto the eye. The CDRH and ANSI 
categorize aided and unaided viewing conditions under the same category numbering. 
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Class 1 lasers are eye-safe for two reasons. Firstly, it may be because the energy 
output is so low that aided or unaided viewing cannot cause injury to the eye. However, a 
laser may also be classified under Class 1 even if it is not eye-safe. This applies to lasers 
which have safeguards in place to ensure that the lasers would not be exposed under 
normal operation. For example, laser printers use lasers of considerable power. However, 
human access to the laser radiation should not occur under normal use. As a result, most 
laser printers are categorized under Class 1. Also, it should be noted that it may not be 
safe to view a Class 1M laser with an optical aid. The Accessible Emission Limit (AEL) 
of Class 1 lasers, which is the maximum permitted level of accessible emitted radiation, 
is 0.4 mW. 
Class 2 lasers are safe only if viewed for less than 0.5 seconds. This takes into 
consideration the eye aversion time, which is a reflex action which will cause a person to 
turn away from a bright light source within 0.25 seconds. As mentioned earlier, eye 
aversion only occurs when the light source is visible light. Therefore, Class 2 lasers are 
all visible light lasers. The AEL for Class 2 lasers is from 0.4 to 1.0 mW. 
Class 3A denotes lasers that normally would not produce a hazard if only viewed 
for momentary periods. For Class 3A lasers using visible wavelengths, their power is up 
to 500 mW since human eyes are protected by eye aversion. In addition, there is a 
requirement that their irradiance, which is the incident power per unit area, does not 
exceed 25 W/m2. For Class 3A lasers using invisible wavelengths, a much lower AEL 
limit of 2 mW is specified since eye aversion does not take place. 
Class 3B denotes lasers that can produce a hazard if viewed directly. This 
includes intrabeam viewing or specular reflections. Viewing the diffuse reflections from 
Class 3B lasers should be limited to 10 seconds. The AEL limit for Class 3B lasers is 
different for continuous wave (500 mW) and pulsed sources (105 J/m2). 
Class 4 lasers can produce a hazard not only from direct or specular reflections, 
but also from a diffuse reflection. In addition, such lasers may produce fire and skin 
hazards. Class 4 lasers include all lasers in excess of Class 3 limitations. Also, a laser is 
classified as a Class 4 laser if the output power exceeds 0.5 watts. This is quite a contrast 
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to a 100-watt light bulb that emits its energy in all directions. The is because of the high 
irradiance of these lasers. 
It has been mentioned that products which are “eye-safe” belong outside the 
visible or near- infrared wavelengths. However, “eye-safe” lasers may also be classified 
up to Class 4, where they may easily cause damage to the eyes and even human skin. 
Class 4 “eye-safe” products are certainly not safe to the eye. 
Class 3B and 4 lasers require controlled access. Filtering goggles and safety 
training is required to enter the area. Class 2, 2M and 3R lasers require restricted access. 
This is where access is permitted only to those that have completed laser safety training. 
Class 1 lasers are allowed in areas in which access is unrestricted. 
Many FSO systems belong to Class 1 and 1M. However, Class 3R and 3B FSO 
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V. ACQUISITION, POINTING, AND TRACKING 
This chapter takes a look at the requirements specific to deploying an FSO system 
on mobile platforms. Like most line-of-sight mobile wireless communication systems, 
FSO systems first require the transmitter to know the location of the receiver. This is 
called the acquisition phase. The transmitter must then accurately send its signal towards 
the receiver (pointing phase). As the transmitter and/or receiver may be moving, the 
system must also be able to change the direction of the beams so that continued 
communication can be attained (tracking phase). This chapter takes a look at the 
challenge of acquisition, pointing, and tracking for FSO systems on mobile platforms. 
 
A. ACQUISITION 
For two terminals to communicate, they must know the position of the other 
terminal. The acquisition phase is where the terminals try to locate one another. The 
small divergences of the laser beams used in FSO systems require highly accurate 
knowledge of the other terminal’s position. 
It is also because of the small divergence of laser beams that using these beams to 
scan the wide expanse of possible locations is usually not feasible. Furthermore, most 
applications require a short acquisition time for on-demand communications. 
To start with, some rough locale can be exchanged through systems like the 
Global Positioning System / Inertial Navigation System (GPS/INS). Since the FSO link 
has not been set up, this exchange is usually done via RF or microwave radio. The 
resolution of the coordinates provided by GPS systems is generally not accurate enough 
for directing laser beams. Good GPS systems have uncertainties of +/- 5 meters in 
longitude and latitude, and altitude readings are notoriously inaccurate because of the 
variances in the atmosphere. Newer Differential GPS (DGPS) systems are accurate to +/- 
1 meter in longitude and latitude, and barometric and radar altimeters are usually much 
more accurate than GPS systems in providing altitude. Combining these readings in real-
time to another fast-moving terminal would be challenging. 
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For platforms like non-stationary satellites which have somewhat fixed flying 
profiles, tracking software can provide a general indication of the position of such a 
platform. 
To lock-in on the FSO transceiver of the opposite terminal, usually a beacon 
beam is used. This is a laser beam with a beam divergence much wider than that of its 
communication beam. In certain literatures, the beacon beam is also called the probe 
beam. Figure 43 illustrates how a beacon beam is used between the ESA’s Artemis 
satellite and Japan’s OICETS (Optical Inter-orbit Communications Engineering Test 
Satellite) satellite. Live tests for this procedure were successfully conducted from 9 to 14 
September 2003 [JAXA 2003]. 
 
Figure 43.   Using a Beacon Beam for Acquisition and Pointing [Arai 2001] 
 
Artemis first scans the uncertainty area where OICETS may be located with its 
beacon beam. Initial acquisition efforts through the use of GPS or other means may have 
narrowed down the uncertainty area to about 1o ´ 1o. Meanwhile, OICETS ensures that 
its field-of-view covers the locations in which Artemis may be located (Figure 43a). 
Upon detecting the beacon beam from Artemis, OICETS immediately transmits a 
communication beam to Artemis (Figure 43b). Once Artemis detects the communication 
beam from OICETS, Artemis stops scanning the beacon beam. It then transmits a 
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communication beam to OICETS, and switches off its beacon beam. OICETS receives 
the communication beam from Artemis (Figure 43c). To initiate optical inter-orbit 
communications, each satellite continuously transmits the communication beam towards 
the other to enable the counter satellite to improve its pointing accuracy. 
Another device that can aid in the acquisition of a communications link is a corner 
cube reflector, as shown in Figure 44. A corner cube reflector consists of 3 orthogonal 
mirrors. The property of the corner cube reflector that makes it useful in acquisition is 
that it reflects incident light in the same direction back to the source of the incident light. 
This reflection is called a retro-reflection. 
 
Figure 44.   Corner Cube Reflector (After: [Sporian 2003]) 
 
The corner cube reflector can be used to reflect light from a beacon beam. The 
sender of the beacon beam would then detect the light from the corner cube reflector and 




After the acquisition phase, the transmitter would have accurate knowledge of the 
location of the receiver. The problem of pointing involves accurately placing the laser 
beam such that it is indeed pointing towards the receiver. The small divergence beam of 
lasers requires very fine adjustments in the pointing angle. The smallest degree in which 
the pointing angle  can  be  adjusted is  called  the pointing  resolution. Of course, this 
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difficulty may be alleviated through the use of a more divergent beam, however, as 
discussed earlier in this report, this means a compromise in power efficiency and security 
of transmission. 
The laser link between the ESA’s Artemis satellite and the French SPOT 4 
satellite will be used as an example of determining the required pointing resolution. The  
pointing resolution can be understood as the minimum shift in the pointing angle of the 
laser beam so that it will be able to continually track the target. Figure 45 illustrates that 
in order for Artemis to continually track a faster-moving SPOT 4 satellite, the angular 
resolution of the tracker will have to be at most q, which is also equal to the beam 
divergence.  
 
Figure 45.   Pointing Resolution of Tracker 
 
However, as analyzed in an earlier section on directional precision, a pointing 
resolution equal to the beam divergence will result in many gaps in the beam pattern seen 
at the receiver’s location. These gaps mean that the transmitter will not be able to 
effectively point the laser beam at the receiver. It was also earlier pointed out that the 
maximum pointing resolution will have to be q/2 or less. The beam divergence from the 
Artemis satellite is known to be 2 arcseconds (0.000556 degrees). From the above 
analysis, the pointing resolution will have to be at most 1 arcsecond (~0.000278 degree). 
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Typical pointing resolutions range from 1 to 200 mrad (0.00002865 to 0.00573 degrees), 
although most systems typically have a pointing accuracy of 10 to 50 mrad (0.0002865 to 
0.0014325 degrees) [Reyes 2002] [Wilson 2000] [Lee 2000] [Korevaar 1999]. 
FSO terminals on mobile platforms will usually be subject to the effect of wind. It 
is important to know the direction and velocity of the wind common to the deployment 
scenario. Laser terminals and their supporting structures must be able to prevent these 
forces from affecting the pointing accuracy or causing damage to the structures on which 
the components are mounted. FSO terminal designs react differently to wind forces, 
depending on the area presented to the wind. This is known as wind loading. 
The Air Force Research Laboratory Sensors Directorate (AFRL/SN) mounted 
what they called their Laser Communications Terminal (LCT) in a turret on the underside 
of the fuselage of a T-39A (or Sabreliner 40) test aircraft (Figure 46). The turret protects 
the LCT from wind effects. 
 
Figure 46.   The AFRL/SN’s T-39A Test Aircraft with Laser Communication  
Terminal (From: [Gill 1997]) 
 
At least part of the turret needs to be transparent to allow the laser’s signal to 
propagate through. However, these glass windows tend to reflect light, causing a loss in 
the laser power transmitted or received. The amount of light reflected is higher for 
higher- index glass. However, the refractive index of glass is usually at least 1.4, which 
gives a maximum reflectance of about 4% at normal incidence. 
Antireflection (AR) coatings are usually applied to the turret window to minimize 
reflectance. These are usually thin, dielectric or metallic films that can reduce reflections 
down to a fraction of a percent, depending on the type of coating used. 
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Figure 47.   Reflectance of BK7 Glass with Single-Layer Coating at  
Normal Incidence (After: [AOPL 2003]) 
 
Figure 47 shows the reduction in reflectance of BK7 glass when a single- layer 
coating of MgF2 (made by Astro Optics Pvt. Ltd.) is applied. Reflectance values of above 
4% are reduced to about 1.5%. The resultant reflectance behavior is a curve which can be 
tuned for minimal reflectance at other wavelengths from UV to IR [AOPL 2003]. Single-
layer coatings are widely used because of the low cost. 
Astro Optics also makes V-coatings specially designed for specific wavelengths, 
which is useful for laser optics. As can be seen from Figure 48, the V-shaped graph of 
reflectance gives very low reflectance (less than 0.3%) at the tuned frequency of 1064 
nm, while other frequencies experience higher reflectance. 
 
Figure 48.   Reflectance of BK7 Glass with V-Coating at Normal Incidence 
(After: [AOPL 2003]) 
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The higher reflectance at frequencies other than the tuned frequency is useful in 
attenuating unwanted signals. Many AR coatings are also designed not only to withstand 




For mobile platforms, the problem of tracking is to ensure that laser beams are 
continually pointed towards the receiver. One of the basic requirements of tracking is the 
frequency in which the direction of the laser beam needs to change in reaction to a 
change in relative location of the receiver. This is referred to as the tracking frequency. 
Consider the example of the Artemis and SPOT 4 satellites. It is known that 
before Artemis reached its geo-stationary orbit, it was moving at 7,000 mph. SPOT 4, 
which was at an altitude of 832 km, would have been moving at approximately 16,600 
mph. To determine the tracking frequency requirement, the worst case of relative speed 
would have to be taken. This would be where both satellites were moving in opposite 
directions of one another. In this case, it can be said that SPOT 4 was moving at a relative 
speed of 16,600 + 7,000 = 23,600 mph away from Artemis. 
With this speed, it is necessary to determine the shortest duration of time that 
SPOT 4 would be within Artemis’ laser beam. This is because the shortest duration will 
determine the minimum frequency that Artemis should be able to update its beam 
position so that it does not lose the SPOT 4 satellite. Figure 49 illustrates that this shortest 
duration occurs when the SPOT 4 satellite is directly below Artemis. SPOT 4 spends the 
shortest duration in an Artemis laser beam in this position because the distance it needs to 




Figure 49.   Tracking Frequency 
 
With SPOT 4 moving at a relative speed of 23,600 mph, it would take less than 30 
milliseconds (ms) for it to travel 300m. Therefore, in order for Artemis to be able to 
continually track SPOT 4, it should be able to change the direction of its laser beam once 
every 30 ms. In other words, the laser tracker should have a tracking frequency which is 
faster than 33 times per second or 33 Hertz. Once again, a more divergent laser beam 
would lower the tracking frequency requirement, but this would be at the cost of power 
efficiency and security of transmission. 
It is noted that the example of ESA satellites is more elementary from a tracking 
point of view because the satellites are traveling in well-understood orbital paths. This 
means that the next location in which the laser beam should be pointed can be calculated 
beforehand by tracking software. There is less need for one satellite to sense the direction 
in which the other satellite is headed. This would be necessary in the case of other mobile 
platforms like planes and ships where the course of the receiving terminal is not known 
beforehand. 
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Conventional trackers have their lasers mounted on gimbals which are controlled 
by mechanical servos. A gimbal is basically a device that permits a body (in this case the 
laser) to incline freely in any direction. The OPALE and PASTEL optical terminals on 
board the Artemis and SPOT 4 satellites respectively were of this design. 
 
Figure 50.   The PASTEL Optical Terminal on board the SPOT 4 Satellite  
(From: [CNES 2000]) 
 
Non-mechanical beam steering, which involves tracking with no moving parts, is 
being developed to permit high speed tracking of targets such as satellites and planes. 
Furthermore, non-mechanical beam steering does not cause jitter to the platform on 
which the laser terminal is mounted. Satellites are particularly prone to jitter caused by 
the moving of the relatively bigger optical terminals. Figure 51 shows the prototype of a 




Figure 51.   AFRL’s Gimballess Pointing and Tracking Prototype  
(After: [Chalfant 2002]) 
 
D. MODULATING RETRO-REFLECTORS 
As seen from the earlier sections of this chapter, the tasks of pointing and tracking 
are more challenging than that of acquisition because of the narrow communication 
beam. Modulating Retro-Reflectors (MRR) alleviate this problem by making use of 
corner cube reflectors. 
 
Figure 52.   Concept of a Modulating Retro-Reflector (After: [NRL 2001]) 
 
Figure 52 shows a modulator coupled in front of a corner cube reflector. When 
the modulator is off, light cannot pass, and there is no return beam. When the modulator 
is on, the beam will be allowed through. Data can be encoded into the retro-reflected 
beam by allowing data to drive the modulator. 
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Figure 53.   Feeding a Data Source to a Modulating Retro-Reflector  
(After: [NRL 2001]) 
 
The Multiple Quantum Well (MQW) modulator is one such modulator patented 
by the U.S. Navy Research Laboratory (NRL) [NRL 2001]. NRL claims that the MQW 
Modulator is robust, operates at low voltages (less than 20V) and low power (tens of 
milliWatts), and is capable of very high switching speeds. Currently, MQW modulators 
have been demonstrated at 10 Mbps. NRL claims that Gbps data rates can be supported. 
With MRR’s, only one terminal requires an onboard laser and tracker, thereby 
significantly reducing the payload on the other terminal. The NRL had demonstrated in 
the winter of 2000 the use of a tiny 0.5 cm diameter MQW MRR on a small rotary-wing 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). Bit rates ranged from 400 Kbps to 2 Mbps and the 
UAV was flown 35 to 65 meters from the transmit/receive laser. The Modulating Retro-
Reflector (MRR) represents a unique solution to the problem of pointing and tracking for 
mobile FSO platforms. 
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Deciding whether it is appropriate to equip a particular mobile military platform 
with an FSO terminal requires substantial understanding of the technology. It is helpful to 
have some understanding of various fields like computer science, physics (optics), 
electrical engineering (EMR), mechanical engineering (gimbals & trackers), and even 
ophthalmology (the human eye). From the earlier discussions in this report, it should be 
clear that it is not a simple question of whether FSO is a good technology. Instead, 
careful thought should be given to the various issues in order to decide whether FSO is 
suitable for a target mobile military platform. 
This final chapter attempts to assist such an analysis through a series of questions 
and discussions. These questions relate to the bandwidth requirement, communications 
security, the atmospheric conditions, and the requirements of acquisition, positioning, and 
tracking. Finally, to illustrate, a case study will be discussed. 
 
A. BANDWIDTH 
One of the best-known features of FSO technology is the high bandwidth. The 
lure of Gigabits-per-second (Gbps) transmissions  is great. However, achieving Gbps data 
rates on mobile platforms has not matured, with practical deployments only achieving up 
to 50 Mbps. One of the highest data rates achieved in research is that done by the Air 
Force Research Laboratory Sensors Directorate (AFRL/SN), which achieved a 1.1 Gbps 
data rate on a simulated mobile platform [Gill 1997]. It is not known whether any 
operational aircraft have been fitted with the AFRL’s FSO terminal. 
Therefore, immediate deployments on mobile platforms may only be looking at 
data rates of around 50 Mbps. If this is acceptable, coupled with the promise of 
scalability, then the decision to deploy FSO terminals may be justified. 
Of course, the question needs to be asked as to whether there is indeed a 
requirement for Gbps bandwidth. Data rates of up to 50 Mbps can be achieved by current 
RF radios. If the higher bandwidth is only a “nice-to-have,” and the other issues 
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discussed in this chapter are not supportive of deploying FSO, then it should be 
considered whether other RF technologies are more suitable. 
Whether or not an FSO terminal can achieve high bandwidth largely depends on 
whether a high-powered laser can be used. This is because more power in the signal gives 
it a higher signal-to-noise ratio. If the deployment scenario is such that it can be ensured 
that humans will not be exposed to the laser, then higher data rates can be achieved 
through the use of more powerful lasers. The AFRL’s FSO terminals were designed for 
communication between aircraft. Evidently, the requirement should be for the two 
aircraft to be at least 1.5 km apart as this is the eye-safe distance of the laser used. More 
powerful lasers also mean a higher signal-to-noise ratio and hence a lower bit error rate. 
Consideration should also be given as to whether the target platform will be able to 
provide the necessary power. Fortuitously, the low free-space loss and the use of power-
efficient semiconductor lasers can alleviate this problem. 
 
B. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY 
Another main feature of FSO is the security of communications. As should be 
inferred from the earlier discussions on this topic, FSO systems are indeed very much 
more secure than the other wireless options. However, a low probability of detection, 
interception, and exploitation does not mean that there is no chance of compromise. 
Various means of detecting, intercepting, and exploiting laser transmissions have been 
discussed. Therefore, one should still be mindful of avenues of compromise and whether 
these are likely in the intended deployment scenarios. 
 
C. ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS 
It has been discussed that FSO systems can be designed for maximum 
atmospheric transmittance by selecting the appropriate wavelength of laser. Furthermore, 
the use of adaptive optics, wavelength variation techniques, and redundant links help 
combat the adverse atmospheric effects. 
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Deciding whether to deploy FSO should take into account the atmospheric 
environment of the deployment scenario. For example, a new requirement may be for 
warships to receive their orders through wireless transmission from the base headquarters 
at the harbor. However, more often than not, the harbor is covered with fog. It should be 
clear that FSO is not an ideal solution for this wireless link because fog greatly attenuates 
the laser power. However, if rather than fog, it often rains at the harbor, then FSO may be 
a better option, since the alternative of microwave radios would be greatly disrupted by 
rain. 
The brute-force method of combating the effects of the atmosphere is to use more 
power. Once again, the feasibility of doing this depends on whether there are any laser 
safety issues, and whether the target platform can provide sufficient power. 
 
D. ACQUISITION, POINTING, AND TRACKING 
Pertaining to mobile platforms, the acquisition, pointing, and tracking (APT) 
system should be suitable for the target platform. 
The acquisition should be reliable and take place within a reasonable amount of 
time. This system is likely to be different from that used for pointing and tracking. If a 
Global Positioning System / Inertial Navigation System (GPS/INS) system is used, the 
exchange of coordinates may be accomplished through some other RF system. If the 
acquisition is through the use of beacon beam, this beam is usually sent by a separate 
laser. Failure of the acquisition system means that communication cannot take place even 
if the communication lasers are in good functioning order. 
Being a line-of-sight communications link, the pointing of the laser beam and the 
tracking of the opposite terminal cannot allow the line-of-sight to be blocked. Two 
aspects of the deployment scenario have to be considered. Firstly, the line-of-sight 
between the two communicating platforms should be maintained throughout operation. 
Secondly, it must be possible to mount the FSO terminal on the platform such that no part 
of the platform itself would block the line-of-sight. Examples are the tail fins and wings 
of planes and UAV’s, and the solar panels of satellites. 
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The tracking frequency of the FSO system has been analyzed as the speed in 
which the tracking system must sense and react to a change in relative position of the 
opposite terminal. Different mobile platforms move at different speeds. Therefore, an 
analysis should be conducted as to whether the tracking frequency of the system is 
sufficient to track the worst case rate of change of angular position of the opposite 
terminal. 
 
E. CASE STUDY 
In early 1999, Lucent Technologies demonstrated a ship-to-pier FSO link between 
the USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) moored pierside, and the Port Operations Building at 
the U.S. Navy North Island Facility in San Diego, California [Nykolak 1999]. The details 
of this demonstration will be discussed to determine whether or not the FSO system 
demonstrated was suitable for this requirement. 
The FSO terminals by AstroTerra Corporation provided an OC-3 (155 Mbps) link 
between the USS Stennis and the Port Operations Building. For the trial, a 10 Mbps 
NIPRNET (Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network) connection and 4 voice-pairs 
were multiplexed onto the FSO link. These requirements, together with the network 
management traffic never exceeded 7% of the OC-3 link capacity. If these were the only 
requirements for this link, then the OC-3 provided was an overkill. If an FSO terminal of 
lower capacity was used (e.g. 50 Mbps), the tests would probably have attained much 
better availability figures than the 99.92% to 99.96% reported. This corresponds to a bit 
error rate of 4 ´ 10-4 to 8 ´ 10-4 which is considered high for an FSO link. Furthermore, 
with a 50 Mbps link, the utilization figure would only have stood at about 21%, which is 
still a low figure. 
The NIPRNET and voice information did not seem to be sensitive. If so, then 
communications security may not be an issue. Because of this, there is little concern that 
the reported beam divergence of 1 mrad is slightly larger than a typical 0.5 mrad figure. 
Furthermore, the link was only 183 yards long (~167 m). At this distance, the laser would 
only have a width of about 17 cm.  
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Fog is quite a problem at the North Island Facility in San Diego. The trials 
conducted attributed 25 to 35 dB attenuation (300 to 3,000 times) primarily due to fog. 
As mentioned earlier, one way to transmit an FSO signal through fog is to increase its 
power. The wavelengths used by the FSO system on board the ship are 750 and 850 nm 
for the transmit and receive beams, respectively. These wavelengths are not suitable for 
high-power lasers. 
Wavelength (nm) 750 850 1310 1550 
Maximum Permissible Exposure – MPE (mW/cm2) 1.2 2.0 40 100 
Table 5 ANSI Maximum Permissible Exposure Limit for Unaided Viewing  
[Nykolak 1999] 
 
As can be seen from Table 5, according to ANSI regulations, the Maximum 
Permissible Exposure (MPE) for a 1550 nm laser is 50 to 100 times greater than the 
MPE’s for 750 and 850 nm respectively. In terms of practical implications, a 1550 nm 
wavelength can safely transmit at almost 100 times more optical power than a 750 nm 
wavelength, and still be considered eye-safe for unaided viewing. One of the main 
reasons why 750 and 850 nm lasers are popular is because they are low cost. 
Although the USS Stennis was moored at pier, waves caused by passing ships 
would cause it to have some roll and yaw. Furthermore, as crane activity was very high at 
the pier, it was necessary to place the FSO terminal very high on the ship superstructure. 
This accentuated the ship’s roll and pitch motion. The tide levels at the North Island 
Facility vary by up to 8 feet. This also contributed to a change in the relative positions of 
the FSO terminals. 
Two different sets of FSO terminals were considered and tested for the Ship-to-
Pier Demonstration; a simple, completely passive design and a more sophisticated design 
that includes autotracking. Attempts to compensate for ship motion utilizing the passive 
optical terminals requires increasing the transmission divergence of the laser beam to 
cover a larger area at the receiver which envelopes the anticipated beam wander resulting 
from the motion. It was decided that autotracking was necessary to compensate for the 
ship motion of the USS Stennis. 
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In summary, the bit error rates attained by the AstroTerra Corporation FSO 
terminals are too high. Using a lower-bandwidth link should give better bit error rates 
without causing congestion in the link. The North Island Facility in San Diego tends to 
have too much fog, and is therefore not friendly to FSO terminals. The wavelengths used 
by the AstroTerra terminals are not suitable for high-power use as they would pose a 
danger for the people working on the pier. Autotracking terminals should be used because 
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